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I. INTRODUCTION
An axiomatic feature of all modern States is the need for
bankruptcy laws.' This recognition traces back to the earliest of
civilized times, when it was first realized that the existence of
commerce is inherently entwined with the inevitable failing of
some enterprises.2 Over the last two decades, with the expansion
of worldwide trade resulting from improvements to modern
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1. See David C. Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy
Agreement; Les Prospects Pour Une Convention De La Faillite En Amerique Du
Nord; Los Prospectos Para Un Convenio De Quiebra De Norte America, 2 Sw. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 81, 81 (1995) (stating that the founding fathers of the United
States recognized the need for bankruptcy laws and therefore granted Congress
the right to enact bankruptcy legislation); see also James W. Bowers, Whither
What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory and Elementary
Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27, 43 (1991) (stating that
bankruptcy law is needed in an imperfect world).
2. See CARL FELSENFELD, BANKRUPTCY 1 (2d ed. 1997) (citing the Roman
Twelve Tables); see also Cook, supra note 1, at 97-99 (tracing the bankruptcy
regimes of the North American Free Trade Agreement members to the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi amongst other ancient bankruptcy codes).
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technology and the opening of the former Soviet bloc, businesses
have become multinational entities and their bankruptcies have
consequently increased in both size and scope.' Additionally, the
proliferation of regional trade agreements has expanded the
stream of commerce across borders, allowing for the establishment
of continental corporations.4 Given that these new businesses are
subject to the jurisdiction of all the countries in which they are
incorporated, it is essential that an effective and efficient apparatus
be instituted for handling the complexities of cross-border
insolvency cases.5 Harmonization of insolvency laws, or at a
3. See CARL FELSENFELD, FELSENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
1-9 (2000) (arguing that increased globalization has caused "growth in both the
number and size of international insolvencies."); Am. Law Inst., Transnational
Insolvency Project: International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law xxv-
xxvi (Tentative Draft, 1997) [hereinafter ALI Canadian Statement]; Paula E.
Garzon et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 1998: Business
Transactions and Disputes, 33 INT'L LAW. 379, 379-81 (1999) (discussing the
global impact that resulted from the Asian economic crisis of 1998 and which led
to the realization of the interdependency of the world's commercial markets);
Claudia Tobler, Note, Managing Failure in the New Global Economy: The
U.N.C.I.T.R.A.L. Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 22 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 383, 383 (1999) (stating "[t]he recent crisis in the Asian economic
markets, and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, are but two examples of
the potential terrors of the 'new economic order' in which transnational
corporations operate and in which we now live.").
4. See North America Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 1077 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (establishing a free trade zone in North America); Treaty
Establishing the European Community, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 (establishing a custom's union among the various European countries).
5. Numerous non-governmental bodies have commenced attempts at such
projects. For instance, the United Nations has adopted a Model Law on Cross
Border Insolvency. See U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex 1, at 68-78, U.N. Doc.
A/52/17 (1997) [hereinafter UN Adoption of Model Law on Cross Border
Insolvency]; The International Bar Association's Cross-Border Insolvency
Concordat, reprinted in John A. Barrett & Timothy E. Powers, Proposal for
Consultative Draft of Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act for
Adoption by Domestic Legislation with or without Modification, 17 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 323 (1989); The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WITSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 976, 35 I.L.M. 1223
(1996) [hereinafter EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings]; The Am. Law
Inst., Transnational Insolvency Project: Principles Of Cooperation In
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minimum, increased cooperation among trading partners must be
established to maintain the current trend towards globalization.
Otherwise, fearing potential losses if a foreign business associate
files for insolvency relief, entrepreneurs may stop investing
internationally.6 Recently, there has been an effort to establish
international insolvency agreements. For example, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law7 as well as
regional endeavors by the European Union' and the North
American countries,9  have made attempts to create such
agreements.
Another issue related to the growth of international
commerce, is the fear of potential increases in environmental
contamination caused by multinational corporations.'" This
Transnational Cases Among the Members of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (Tentative Draft, 2000) [hereinafter ALl Cooperative Agreement].
6. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational
Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1997) (arguing that inconsistency in regard
to choice of law issues in the administration of cross-border insolvency
proceedings is detrimental to social welfare and decreases efficiency).
7. See UN Adoption of Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, supra note
5 (recommending nations to implement mechanisms for dealing with cases of
cross-border insolvency).
8. See EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 5; see also
Mike Perry, Lining Up At the Border: Renewing the Call for a Canada-U.S.
Insolvency Convention in the 21st Century, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 469, 483
(2000) (stating that the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings
combines the bankruptcy laws of individual member states with a universal
proceeding).
9. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5 (suggesting guidelines to
enhance coordination and harmonization of cross border insolvency proceedings
between the United States and Canada).
10. See Rick Monte Reznicsek, Note, International Environmental
Bankruptcy: An Overview of Environmental Bankruptcy Law, Including a State's
Claims Against the Multinational Polluter, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345, 346-
47 (1990) (stating that the implementation of environmental legislation in the
United States was precipitated by the influx of pollution produced by
multinational corporations); Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad v. United Mexican
States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209 (2001) (asserting that NAFTA's
implementation opened the back door for international investors to attack
environmental laws and regulations).
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disquietude has been addressed by international agreements
pertaining to environmental protection and by environmental
activists utilizing political tactics to prevent pollutant activities.1"
Yet the mechanisms currently in place do not address the issues
that may arise if a transnational entity files for insolvency relief
with multiple States pursuing environmental claims against it.
The dilemma of environmental claims interacting with
bankruptcy laws is not limited to the international realm, U.S.
domestic law has, since the inception of environmental legislation,
addressed the interplay between the two.' On the national level, a
primary goal of insolvency laws is to allow a debtor to reenter
society free from debt-to provide the debtor with a fresh start. 3
Underlying this goal is the belief that a rehabilitated debtor is more
beneficial to society than having the entity remain debt ridden. 4
To accomplish this objective, a debtor is granted a stay or
moratorium from all ongoing proceedings or from the
commencement of new actions, and subsequently allowed to
discharge pre-petition debts.5 However, environmental laws may
be inconsistent with bankruptcy's policy of attempting to clean a
11. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-
14 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement]; Paulette L.
Stenzel, Can NAFTA 's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable
Development?, 59 ALB. L. REv. 423, 439 (1995) (stating that environmentalist
groups pressured the Clinton administration to include environmental provisions
within NAFTA).
12 See infra Part II.
13. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 2; see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1994) (stating that the fresh start objective is the primary principle
for bankruptcy legislation and explained that the fresh start was in the "public as
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns.., a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt."); Williams v. United States Fidelity Ins.
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1945) (creating the actual phrase "fresh start"
originated by stating that the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to "start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes.").
14. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 167.
15. See infra Part II.F.
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debtor's slate.16 Environmental legislation as a whole, seeks to
protect the environment and preserve public health and safety
through imposing full liability for hazardous waste clean up on
potentially responsible .parties ("PRP"). 17  The imposition of
liability in the environmental context is based upon the belief that
commercial entities should bear the burden of protecting the
external costs to society associated with their activities. 8 Thus,
where environmental claims are asserted against a debtor in
bankruptcy, which of the inconsistent policies underlying
bankruptcy and environmental law should take precedence?
Should the goal of granting the debtor a fresh start trump the
policy that a polluter should pay for its actions or vice versa?
This Note will explore the issues raised when environmental
claims arise during the course of international insolvencies. More
specifically, it will provide an analysis of the treatment afforded to
environmental claims of two nations being adjudicated in a single
bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to the Model Law on
International Insolvency that was adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")19 and
the Transnational Insolvency Project forwarded by the American
Law Institute ("ALI").' ° The Note will conclude by arguing that
currently proposed protocols, which are limited to procedural
aspects of international insolvencies, must endeavor to include
provisions addressing the intersection of non-bankruptcy law which
will inevitably arise in transnational bankruptcies. Without a
complete integration of all potential issues that can be encountered
in a bankruptcy case, the inherent difficulties associated with
multinational proceedings will nullify the utility of the protocols.
Part II of the Note will begin by discussing how the American
judiciary has reconciled its Bankruptcy Code's fresh start objective
16. See infra Part II.A.1.
17. See infra Part II.A.1.
1& See infra Part II.A.1.
19. See UN Adoption of Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, supra note
5 (providing guidelines to coordinate cross-border insolvency proceedings).
20. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5 (suggesting guidelines to
enhance coordination and harmonization of cross-border insolvency proceedings
between the United States and Canada).
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and substantive provisions vis-A-vis the U.S. policy of strict
environmental liability. Part III of the Note suggests a detailed
hypothetical, which seeks to assess whether a Canadian
environmental claim would be afforded treatment comparable to
an American environmental claim if they were both brought in a
single United States bankruptcy proceeding. The part will also
provide an overview of the policies underlying international
insolvency. Part IV applies the provisions of the UNCITRAL
Model Rule on International Insolvency 2' to the hypothetical as
well as providing an outline of the Model Law's structure. In a
similar vein, Part V puts the principles articulated in the ALI
Transnational Insolvency Project 22 into practice by applying them
to the hypothetical, and summarizes the structure and goals of the
project.
II. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN A UNITED STATES
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
A. United States Legislation
1. Environmental Law
In the last few decades there has been a proliferation of both
environmental legislation and litigation.' Recent legislation in the
area reflects society's tremendous concern with these issues and
21. See UN Adoption of Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, supra note
5.
22. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5.
23. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370d (1998); Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1998); Clean
Air Act §§ 109-371, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1998); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1998); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1998)
[hereinafter CERCLA]; see also Jeffrey S. Theuer, Aligning Environmental
Policy and Bankruptcy Protection: Who Pays for Environmental Claims Under
the Bankruptcy Code?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 465, 477 n.79 (1996) (listing
various other environmental laws that have been implemented).
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has attempted to prevent future pollutant activities as well as
provide remedies to alleviate existing environmental damage.2 ' An
example of this effort is the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act25 ("CERCLA"), one of
the most extensive environmental laws addressing release of
hazardous substances. CERCLA provides that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") "may dispose of hazardous waste or
remediate contaminated property when there is an imminent or
substantial danger to the public health or welfare., 26 If the EPA
deems property to be a substantial risk to the public, it may either
order the present owner of the contaminated land to clean up the
property,27 or the EPA may utilize resources from a "Superfund"
established by Congress to abate and clean up the immediate
danger.2' Following the clean up, the government is permitted,
pursuant to section 107 of CERCLA, to collect clean up costs from
24. See Roy B. True, Comment, Dishargeability of CERCLA Liability in
Bankruptcy, 61 UMKC L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1992) (explaining Congress's intent
in enacting CERCLA); Deborah E. Parker, Comment, Environmental Claims in
Bankruptcy: It's a Question of Priorities, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 222-23
(1995) (discussing the purpose for the implementation of environmental laws).
25. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.
26. Parker, supra note 24, at 224. Upon invocation of CERCLA, the EPA
first identifies:
[T]oxic land fills, which pose health hazards in need of immediate attention.
These sites are [then] cleaned up without regard to liability, which is established
after response costs have been incurred. CERCLA does not require
government to identify responsible parties before addressing the health hazards
posed by the site. The act provides the federal and state governments with
authority to act quickly to remedy a dangerous situation without regard to
liability issues.
See generally Elizabeth A. Glass, Superfund & Sara: Are There Any Defenses
Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 385, 386 (1988) (stating that CERCLA provides
the federal government with the authority to clean up toxic waste sites).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
28. See id. § 9604(a) (permitting the EPA to either perform a short-term and
temporary removal action, or it can commence a remedial action to prevent or
minimize the existence of present or future harm to public safety); see also
Geoffrey Thompson, Environmental Liability in Canada: The Risks for Lenders,
Receivers and Trustees, in ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 113, 116 (Patricia Thomas
ed. 1991) (outlining a concise review of EPA procedure involving
environmentally contaminated property).
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PRPs.29 In addition to CERCLA, there are a number of other
federal and state laws that impose liability for different types of
environmental infractions."
Unlike bankruptcy law, environmental legislation is a
relatively recent phenomenon, and consequently, many of its core
principles are in their formative stages. Because "many important
pieces of environmental legislation lack supporting legislative
histories that might clarify issues or illuminate underlying policy
issues,"32 it is difficult to ascertain congressional preference in an
instance where the Bankruptcy Code and environmental law
intersect.33
2. Bankruptcy Law
In 1978, Congress established the Bankruptcy Code 4 to
succeed the prior Bankruptcy Act.35 The fundamental principles
underlying the Act remain intact. The bankruptcy regime is
intended to provide a debtor with the opportunity to free itself
from debt and enable the equitable distribution of a debtor's assets
29. Potential responsible parties for property in violation of environmental
laws include: (1) current owners or operators of a contaminated site, (2) owners
or operators of a site at the time of contamination, (3) person(s) who arranged
for the disposal of the waste, and (4) the person who transported the waste. See
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
30. See sources cited supra note 23.
31. See H. Hamner Hill, Bankruptcy vs. Environmental Protection: A Case
Study in Normative Conflict, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 245, 251 (1998) (stating that
unlike bankruptcy law, environmental protection laws are a recent development).
32. Id.
33. See Joseph S. Maniscalco, Note, At the Crossroads of Environmental
Laws and the Bankruptcy Code: Abandonment and Trustee Personal Liability, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 881-82 (1995) (articulating that the lack of legislative
dialogue in environmental legislation fails to notify the judiciary and potential
litigants the priority Congress wished to afford environmental laws in relation to
other legal objectives).
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) (originally passed as the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Code].
35. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Nelson Act), 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)) (repealed 1978).
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to all its creditors. 6 A bankruptcy proceeding can take two forms:
(1) either a liquidation (2) or a reorganization. Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that upon the liquidation of a debtor's
estate and the distribution of its assets in the manner proscribed by
the Code, most pre-petition debts should be discharged.37
Alternatively, a debtor may create and confirm a reorganization
plan under Chapter 11 or 13, which enables the debtor to procure
rebirth as a rehabilitated entity.38
B. Discharge of Environmental Claims in a United States
Bankruptcy Case
A good place to begin an analysis of how environmental
liabilities are handled in a bankruptcy case is by looking at the
discharge of such debts. A creditor's grievance can only be
discharged in bankruptcy if it is considered a claim by the
bankruptcy court.' Additionally, as a general rule with minor
exceptions, only pre-petition debts can be discharged in
bankruptcy." Thus in order for an environmental obligation to be
36. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing the policies underlying
bankruptcy law).
37. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (providing definitions, rules and
procedures governing certain bankruptcy liquidation proceedings).
38. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74, 1301-30 (providing definitions, rules
and procedures governing bankruptcy reorganization proceedings).
39. See Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of
Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 85, 88-91 (1994)
(describing the determination of whether environmental liabilities are claims in
bankruptcy as the primary battleground in the competing policies between
environmental laws and bankruptcy).
40. See id. at 88.
41. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(1). But see 11 U.S.C. § 502(f)-(i). The
statute allows for the discharge for certain actions taken by the trustee or debtor-
in-possession after the initial order for relief has been filed, in instances where
the debtor exercised its rights pursuant to claims that are deemed by the Code to
have arisen prior thereto. Id. Examples of such claims are when a trustee or
debtor-in-possession exercises its right to reject a contract with a third party
under 11 U.S.C. section 365 or by utilizing its avoidance powers against a
fraudulent transfer by the debtor to a third person pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
548. Additionally, in a Chapter 11 proceeding, claims categorized as
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discharged, it must also be determined whether such a claim arose
prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case or after its
initiation.
1. Environmental Obligations As Allowable "Claims" as Per
Section 101(5) of the United States Bankruptcy Code
The first issue involved with a debtor's environmental
obligation is to determine whether an environmental liability
constitutes a "claim" pursuant to Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code. When drafting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Congress
wanted to ensure that all creditors were included under the
reorganization plan of a debtor's estate, regardless of the status of
their claims.42 This notion led Congress to broadly define the term
"claim" to include any "right to payment whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured.
43
Applying the definition of "claim" to an environmental
obligation, it seems clear that actions brought by environmental
agencies seeking reimbursement from a debtor for cleaning up a
site, or civil penalties imposed as a consequence of CERCLA
violations, fall within the purview of the Section 101(5) definition
of "claim.""
The more difficult question concerning environmental
liabilities is whether injunctions used by federal and state
governments to enjoin environmental regulation offenders
administrative claims under 11 U.S.C. section 503, which by definition arise
subsequent to the onset of the bankruptcy case, are also discharged upon the
confirmation of a repayment plan. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 66.
42. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 15; see also Spracker & Barnette, supra
note 39, at 91 (stating that Congress took a broad view of what constitutes a
"claim" to ensure that all creditors, including those with unmatured or unproven
claims, are not excluded from recovery under the reorganization plan).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
44. Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 91-92. However, the authors note
that environmental claims that are brought in the form of civil penalties, are only
dischargeable against a reorganized debtor but not against an individual in
bankruptcy. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7), 1141(d)(1)-(2)).
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constitute "claims" under the Bankruptcy Code."5 In Ohio v.
Kovacs,6 the Supreme Court held that a state injunction ordering
an individual owner of a site to clean up hazardous waste only
became a claim when the injunction was transformed into a right to
payment.'7 Under Kovacs, a prohibitory injunction that merely
orders the debtor to discontinue certain activities does not give rise
to a right to payment and would consequently pass through the
bankruptcy to the rehabilitated debtor as a non-dischargeable
claim. 8 However, a mandatory or affirmative injunction, requiring
the debtor to expend resources, would satisfy the Kovacs
requirement and would be subject to discharge. 9
Case law subsequent to the Kovacs decision has limited its
holding. In United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
the Second Circuit held that neither a prohibitory nor a mandatory
injunction is a dischargeable claim for bankruptcy purposes."
Although seemingly contradicting Kovacs regarding mandatory
injunctions, the court distinguished Kovacs on the grounds that its
debtor was no longer in possession and a receiver was appointed to
clean up the hazardous waste, whereas the debtor in LTV was in
possession of the contaminated property. 2 The Second Circuit
clearly stated that an injunction becomes a claim under the
45. See id. at 92. Injunctive claims can be structured, as either prohibitory or
mandatory injunctions. Prohibitory injunctions occur when the government,
acting under the authority granted to it by CERCLA or similar legislation,
requires a debtor to cease and desist from all polluting activity. Mandatory or
affirmative injunctions direct a debtor to clean up property or take other
affirmative acts to comply with environmental obligations.
46. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
47. Id. at 282-83 (emphasis added).
48. See Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles,
Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand That Relief Be Afforded Unknown and
Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEv. J. 1 (1995) (stating an injunction to
cease polluting would not be a prepetition claim because it is directed at future
operations).
49. See generally Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279-83 (discussing what types of
injunctions would be considered "claims" under bankruptcy law).
50. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 1006-09.
52 Id. at 1008-09 (discussing the reasoning of the Kovacs Court).
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Bankruptcy Code only if the debtor is not in possession and must
pay someone else to comply with the injunction. 3 However, if the
debtor is in possession, as in the LTV case, then the injunction is
not a claim subject to discharge. 4
Other courts have split over the question of whether
injunctions qualify as claims. In Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (In re Torwico
Electronics, Inc.),55 the Third Circuit held that a state-ordered clean
up of contamination did not constitute a dischargeable claim where
the Chapter 11 debtor was no longer in possession of the
contaminated land. 6 The Torwico decision seems to be at odds
with Kovacs; however, a petition for certiorari by the debtor to the
Supreme Court was denied. The Sixth Circuit went to the
opposite extreme and found in United States v. Whizco, Inc.58 that
an affirmative injunction is a claim even though its debtor
remained in possession of property of the estate and no trustee was
appointed. In Whizco, despite a direct order requiring the debtor
to comply with regulations and no obligation to pay a trustee, the
court found there to be a dischargeable claim. 9
2. When Do Environmental Claims Accrue in a United States
Bankruptcy Case?
Determining whether environmental obligations fall within the
purview of allowable claims addresses only half of the issue
regarding the dischargeability of a claim. The second question is
whether a claim arose prior to the onset of the bankruptcy case or
53. See id.
54. See id at 1009 (stating that "to the extent that an order is obtained under
CERCLA or any other environmental statute that seeks to end or ameliorate
pollution, we are satisfied that nothing in Kovacs permits a discharge of such
obligation.").
55. Torwico Elecs., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (In re Torwico
Elecs., Inc.), 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
56. Id. at 151.
57. Torwico, cert denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994).
58. United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 150-51.
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thereafter.'0 In the former scenario, the claim could be discharged
in bankruptcy, whereas in the latter circumstance the claim will
generally, with only minor exceptions, not be discharged.6 Further
compounding the difficulty in classifying an environmental liability
as pre-petition or post-petition is the fact that "pre-petition acts or
occurrences frequently have post-petition consequences.62
Environmental claims may accrue when the debtor first acts in
violation of environmental laws, "when the hazardous waste is
released, when the release is discovered, or when the cost of
hazardous waste clean up is incurred." 63
The EPA and debtors disagree, not only whether liability
under CERCLA and similar legislation should be categorized as
"claims" in bankruptcy, but also as to when environmental claims
are considered to arise in an insolvency proceeding.
Environmental agencies argue that the government's rights under
CERCLA do not accrue until the government incurs costs to clean
up a contaminated site, and thus it does not have a claim against
the debtor's estate in bankruptcy unless and until the government
expends resources prior to the petition.' As a consequence of the
government's contention for a later trigger date, a debtor's liability
for clean up of a potentially contaminated site does not accrue until
after the bankruptcy case has begun. This would result in the
reorganized debtor bearing responsibility for the clean up costs.6'
60. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 90-91 (stating that only pre-
confirmation claims are subject to discharge at the time of confirmation under
Code section 1141(d)(1)).
61. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62. Parker, supra note 24, at 230 (analogizing the post-petition consequences
of an environmental claim to the consequences of certain tortuous actions, which
are the basis of a tort claim).
63. Id.
64. See generally, Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 88-89 (discussing
the EPA and debtor arguments regarding when a claim arises).
65. For a discussion regarding the dischargeability of prepetition debts, see
supra note 41 and accompanying text. It should be noted that, although arguing
for a later trigger date may be beneficial for the government in a Chapter 11
reorganization case, the converse would be true in a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding. A liquidated debtor would presumably be unable to pay any of its
debts that pass through the bankruptcy, and thus, in such an instance, it would be
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In contrast to the EPA, debtors contend that environmental claims
arise prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case and
should thus be discharged in all bankruptcy proceedings.66
a. The Debtor's Conduct Test
One of the tests used by bankruptcy courts to determine when
environmental liabilities accrue is the debtor's conduct test. In
LTV Corp.,67 the Second Circuit first addressed this issue and ruled
that, as with previous decisions regarding tort claims,6" CERCLA
claims accrue at the time the debtor's conduct gave rise to the
claim.69 The court held that the EPA's pre-petition response costs
constituted a "claim" and were dischargeable "regardless of when
such costs were incurred, so long as such costs concerned release or
threatened release of hazardous waste that occurred before the
debtor filed his Chapter 11 petition."70
The LTV court's decision to focus solely on the exact moment
of the debtor's release or threat to release hazardous waste, as
opposed to also considering the environmental agency's
expenditure of clean up costs, as the time when a claim accrues is a
further manifestation of the pro-debtor approach advocated by the
Bankruptcy Code. Similar to the broad interpretation applied in
determining what constitutes an allowable "claim" under the
beneficial for the government to be a general unsecured creditor within the
bankruptcy and at least recoup a percentage of its debts. It seems therefore, that
in advocating for a later trigger date, the government is willing to sacrifice its
ability to recover in liquidation cases for the benefit of recovering full costs from
rehabilitated debtors. See generally Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 99-
100.
66. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 89-90.
67. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1991).
68. The dilemma in determining whether an environmental liability is
prepetition or postpetition is not unique to environmental jurisprudence. For
instance, tort claims may also be difficult to classify as prepetition or postpetition
where the consequences of a debtor's tortuous act performed prior to the onset
of the bankruptcy case are not discovered until after the petition.
69. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d at 1002-06.
70. Id. at 997-98.
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Bankruptcy Code, the underlying rationale of the debtor's conduct
test is that an expansive understanding of the term should be
applied in evaluating when a claim accrues."
b. Fair Contemplation Test
Another test used by courts to determine when environmental
claims arise in bankruptcy was introduced in In re National
Gypsum Co.,7 and later reiterated by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in California Department of Health Services v. Jensen
(In re Jensen).3 As with the debtor's conduct test, this analysis also
demonstrates a growing acceptance of the bankruptcy perspective
when dealing with the inconsistent policies of environmental or
other laws in an insolvency proceeding. However, unlike the
analysis suggested by the Second Circuit, the fair contemplation
test requires that future response costs must have been "'fairly'
contemplated by the parties"7 ' prior to the case. If it has been
fairly contemplated by the EPA or other governmental agency, it
"need not have 'full information as to Debtors' existing or
potential Superfund liabilities' ... in order to include unliquidated
contingent claims in its Proof of Claim subject to estimation.""
The National Gypsum court identified a number of factors to help
determine whether an environmental claim was fairly
contemplated by the government or EPA pre-petition, including
"knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable,
NPL [National Priorities List] listing, notification by EPA of PRP
liability, commencement of investigation and clean up activities,
and incurrence of response costs."76 Additionally, the court added
"[i]t is immaterial for the purposes of bankruptcy, whether EPA's
claims against the Debtors are ripe for adjudication under
71. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 101.05[l] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1999).
72. In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
73. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925
(9th Cir. 1993).
74. Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407-08.
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. at 408.
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CERCLA, as long as all the elements that can give rise to liability
under CERCLA have occurred pre-petition."77
c. Legal Relationship Test
A third test, articulated primarily by the Third Circuit,
embraces a more pro-creditor approach in resolving the
bankruptcy/environmental dichotomy.78 According to this rule, a
liability can only be considered a claim subject to discharge at the
time a legal relationship was established between the parties. In
other words, the legal relationship test requires the creditor to have
a legitimate cause of action against the debtor at the time of the
petition for it to be a claim subject to discharge in bankruptcy.79
Essentially, this test demonstrates an unwillingness to define
"claim" as broadly as is seemingly necessitated by the literal
language of section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.' Rather it
manifests a preference to utilize "nonbankruptcy substantive law
[to] define[] when a particular relationship between a debtor and a
third party amounts to a legal obligation reflecting a claim for
bankruptcy purposes."'" Application of the legal relationship
77. Id. at 405.
78. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 906 (1992) (finding that the appellants' cause of action came into
existence after the final consummation order of apellee's!bankruptcy was entered
and the claims could not have been precluded by the bankruptcy proceedings);
Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 864 (1985) (holding the appellants, plaintiffs in asbestos-related personal
injury actions who had no manifest injury prior to the consummation date of
appellee employer's reorganization in bankruptcy, did not have dischargeable
claims); Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d
332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
79. See Jennifer A. Pasquarella, Case Note, In this Corner We Have the
Bankruptcy Code's Discharge Provisions and in this Corner, CERCLA, a Strict
Liability Statute: In re Reading Company, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 561, 583-89
(summarizing the Third Circuit's utilization of the legal relationship test); see also
supra note 78 (holding a legal relationship is a prerequisite for the existence of a
claim under the legal relationship test).
80. For the definition of a claim in bankruptcy, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
81. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn.
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analysis to environmental liabilities has the result of prohibiting
pre-petition violations of CERCLA, or other environmental laws,
unless the violation gave rise to a legal claim pursuant to the
applicable environmental legislation pre-petition. A governmental
agency that has yet to incur any response costs or otherwise
expended resources in reaction to an environmental violation does
not have a legal claim against the debtor and the resulting liability
will not be discharged. 2  It is presumed that as long as the
government does not incur clean up costs prior to the petition and
thereby establish a legal relationship, it is unaware of its claim
against the debtor's estate and discharging the liability would be
unjust. 3
C. Abandonment of Environmentally Contaminated Land
Pursuant to Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code
1. Scope of the Abandonment Power
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "after
notice and hearing" the trustee of the bankruptcy estate may
abandon any property "that is burdensome.., or... of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 4  In
1990).
82. See John P. Berkery, The Dischargeability of CERCLA Cleanup Costs
After Bankruptcy, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 417, 418 (1992) (stating that under
CERCLA, the EPA has a cause of action against a polluter only after it incurs
the costs of cleaning up the pollution, while the Bankruptcy Code attempts to
release a debtor from all debts and liabilities that arose prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy petition which creates a controversy). See Parker, supra note 24, at
232 (stating that in applying the legal relationship test criterion to environmental
liability, the government has no cause of action against the debtor under
CERCLA until it incurs response costs).
83. See Parker, supra note 24, at 239 (stating that contingent liability under
CERCLA arises when the debtor's conduct results in the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance and that the property owner's liability is
contingent only upon the EPA taking steps to remedy the environmental
hazard).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
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reorganization cases, the debtor-in-possession is also permitted to
exercise the right of abandonment. 5 Abandonment allows the
trustee to save time and resources by disposing of property that is
of no value or costly to the estate and/or its creditors." Abandoned
property reverts back to the person who holds the possessory
interest (presumably the debtor) who is responsible for any
liabilities related to the property; the creditors are immediately
free to pursue collection of their claims against that person related
to the land because once abandoned the automatic stay is lifted."
Trustees' have attempted to utilize the right of abandonment
on environmentally contaminated land or potential environmental
powder kegs." By abandoning such property, the trustee would rid
the estate of liability that may arise from being associated with
contaminated land during the bankruptcy case.
2. The Midlantic Decision
In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed whether abandonment
powers are in any way limited when attempting to abandon
environmentally contaminated property. Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection'
involved a debtor in the business of processing waste oil. The New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ordered the
debtor to cease its operations because some of its waste oil
contained a toxic carcinogen. After filing for bankruptcy, an
additional 70,000 gallons of contaminated oil were found, so the
trustee attempted to abandon the property and the bankruptcy
85. See id. § 1107(a) (granting a debtor-in-possession the rights of a trustee,
subject to a few exceptions).
86. See id. § 554(b).
87. Id. § 554(c); see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1985);
Maniscalco, supra note 33, at 891-93 (outlining history of abandonment powers).
88. See infra Part II.C.2. (listing various cases where a trustee or debtor-in-
possession have attempted to abandon environmentally contaminated property
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)).
89. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S.
494 (1986).
90. See id.
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court allowed it to proceed.91 On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision,92  not allowing the
abandonment of the property. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that although section 554(a) allows the trustee to abandon
property, it might not do so "in contravention of a state statute or
regulation that -is reasonably designed to protect the public health
or safety from identifiable hazards."93  In carving this narrow
exception to the trustees' right to abandon property, the Court
relied upon rules of statutory construction to argue that Congress
did not intend for section 554 to trump all state and local laws.94
However, in elaborating on it's holding, the Court restricted this
limitation on the trustees' abandonment powers by stating:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee
by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative
or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem
from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to
protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm.95
As is often the case, courts have split over the question of
abandonment of property in violation of environmental legislation
subsequent to the Midlantic decision. The courts over time have
developed two approaches to the question: those that adopt a
broad interpretation of the Midlantic holding, and others that take
a strict interpretive stance. In re Franklin Signal Corp.96 is an
influential decision, often cited by courts wishing to narrowly
91. Id. at 497.
92. City of New York v. Quanta Res. Corp. (In re Quanta Res. Corp.), 739
F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984).
93. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
94. See Maniscalco, supra note 33, at 896-900. Prior to the Code,
abandonment was a judicial power granted to the trustee that was subject to
exceptions. Thus, upon codification, unless Congress specifically addressed an
issue in non-bankruptcy law that should be an exclusion to the right of
abandonment, a court may still find that a trustee does not have an unfettered
right to abandon property which is cumbersome to the estate.
95. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9 (emphasis added).
96. In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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interpret Midlantic and its "imminent and identifiable harm"
standard.' Franklin Signal held that even though the property in
question was in violation of state environmental protection laws,
the land could be abandoned by the trustee because there was no
evidence of imminent danger to the public, there was a small
amount of waste, and there were insufficient funds in the estate to
perform a clean up." The Franklin Signal court also stated that, at
a minimum, in order to allow a trustee to abandon contaminated
property, the trustee must take adequate precautions to ensure
that there is no imminent threat to the public heath." This burden
can be satisfied by investigating the type and degree of hazardous
substances on the land along with informing the appropriate
environmental agency of its findings." °
In contrast, other courts broadly interpret the "imminent and
identifiable harm"'' standard, holding that the trustee cannot
abandon property and must comply with environmental statutes
that are reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety."° On numerous occasions, the Sixth Circuit has prohibited
abandonment that would lead to a violation of environmental
97. Id. at 273 (suggesting the following five factors to be considered in
balancing the inconsistent policies of environmental legislation and the
Bankruptcy Code: (1) the imminence of danger to the public health and safety;
(2) the extent of probable harm; (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste; (4)
the cost to bring the property in compliance with environmental laws; and (5) the
amount and type of funds available in the estate for clean up).
98. Id. at 274.
99. Id. at 272.
100. See id. at 273.
101. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494,
507 n.9 (1986).
102. See, e.g., In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir
1987) (holding trustee could not abandon property in contravention of a state
statute or regulation designed to protect the public health or safety); In re 82
Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a court may
not authorize abandonment of a hazardous waste site absent the formulation of
conditions that will adequately protect the public health and safety); In re
Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 B.R. 34
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that a trustee could not abandon hazardous
waste and under 28 U.S.C. section 959 (b) must comply with valid state laws
affecting such property).
2003] INT'L INSOLVENCY & ENVTL. OBLIGATIONS
protection laws, particularly when there is no responsible party
remaining to remedy the situation."3 In re Peerless Plating Co.' is
an example of a bankruptcy court declining to allow the trustee to
abandon a hazardous waste site. The court in Peerless Plating
declared that the only situations in which abandonment should be
allowed, absent full compliance with environmental legislation, are
when: (1) the environmental law is "so onerous as to interfere with
the bankruptcy adjudication itself"; (2) the environmental law "is
not reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from
identified hazards;" or (3) "the violation caused by abandonment
merely be speculative or indeterminate. '"1'5
Parenthetically, commentators note that 28 U.S.C. section
959(b) requires a trustee or debtor-in-possession to conform to all
applicable state and federal laws in administering the estate.06
Applying this section to the abandonment question would seem to
indicate that abandonment is prohibited if the result would be in
violation of environmental legislation..
D. Bankruptcy Trustee Personal Liability for Environmental
Violations
Related to the issue of a trustee's ability to abandon
environmentally contaminated land is the question of a trustee's
personal liability for environmental violations. Under numerous
environmental laws, an owner or person in control of property is
liable for clean up costs."' Hence, a trustee serving in its capacity
has some of the attributes that may precipitate personal
accountability for the clean up costs of post-petition and pre-
103. See, e.g., Wall Tube, 831 F.2d 118; In re Kent Holland Die Casting &
Plating, Inc., 125 B.R. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that plaintiff was
entitled to expenses incurred by disposal of hazardous waste on property when
defendant abandoned property with waste barrels from in factory).
104. In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
105. Id. at 947.
106. See, e.g., Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 107-09; Janette Brimmer,
Environmental Issues in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 3 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 169
(1996).
107. See supra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text.
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existing environmental contamination.
The Supreme Court in Mosser v. Darrow'°s enunciated the
general standard for a bankruptcy trustee's personal liability
outside the environmental context. In that case, the Court held a
trustee personally liable for deliberately permitting his agents to
profit from trading securities owned by the debtor's estate."°
Although the Mosser decision initially gave rise to a split among
the Courts of Appeal, ' ° subsequent decisions have stated that a
trustee can be held liable for acts deemed to be "willful and
deliberate in violation of [its] duties"" as well as negligent
violations of its obligations."' Applying these criteria to determine
whether a trustee is personally liable for environmental infractions,
it is evident that a trustee who continues to operate the debtor's
business in violation of environmental laws should be individually
responsible under an applicable environmental statute."'
Additionally, the Midlantic decision, which on its face prohibits
abandonment of property in conflict with environmental laws,
would invariably force a trustee to continue operating a debtor's
company in violation of environmental laws. If such a situation
were to arise in an instance where the bankruptcy estate lacked the
assets necessary to pay for clean up of the contaminated property,
the trustee may be in the precarious position of being personally
responsible for the clean up costs.'
In a decision by a bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of
New York, the court did impose liability on the trustee for
108. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
109. Id. at 271-75. The Court stated "equity tolerates in bankruptcy trustees
no interest adverse to the trust." Id. at 271.
110. Compare Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that
bankruptcy trustee is only personally liable for behavior that is determined to be
willful and in deliberate violation of its duties), with In re Cochise College Park,
Inc., 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding trustee liable for intentional and even
negligent acts that are violations of duties imposed on trustee by operation of
law).
111. Sherr, 552 F.2d at 1375.
112. See In re Center Teleproductions, 112 B.R. 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
113. See Maniscalco, supra note 33, at 904-06.
114. See id.
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environmental violations."5 However, concerned with the difficulty
in securing trustees fearing potential liability, the court stated that
estates containing polluted assets which "present an unreasonable
risk of liability to the trustee pursuant to environmental legislation
may constitute acceptable grounds for resignation of a trustee.""..6
Further recognizing the quagmire a trustee confronts when courts
are unwilling to allow it to abandon an environmentally
contaminated asset, other courts have adopted a different
approach."7 Relying on 28 U.S.C. section 959(b), these courts have
held that when trustee liability is in question, the bankruptcy case
should be dismissed because "the trustee has an affirmative duty to
clean up the site in compliance with state law,"'"8 an obligation the
trustee would be unable to comply with if administering an estate
that has insufficient funds to subsidize a clean up."9 A third
method to the trustees' predicament was taken in In re Microfab
Inc.2 The Microfab court held that, because Midlantic precludes a
trustee from abandoning land in contravention of environmental
laws, it should also release the trustee from the obligation to
expend estate assets to clean up a site when an estate lacks
"sufficient resources to achieve appreciable results."''
E. Environmental Claims As an Administrative Expense Priority
In an ordinary bankruptcy case, the status of a creditor's claim
is the decisive factor in determining the extent a creditor will be
able to recover on its grievance against the debtor. Creditors in the
most favorable position are those that hold secured claims in the
bankruptcy, such as by holding liens or mortgages against assets of
the debtor's estate at the time of the petition.' Under the
115. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd. Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
116. Id. at 222.
117. See In re Commercial Oil Service, Inc., 88 B.R. 126 (N.D. Ohio 1987); 82
Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 91 B.R. at 213.
118. In re Mattice Indus., Inc., 76 B.R. 44, 47 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
119. Id. at 47-48.
120. In re Microfab Inc., 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
121. Id. at 166.
122. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 507 (1988).
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Bankruptcy Code, secured claimants are entitled to recover the full
value of their collateral, or, where the collateral value exceeds the
claim amount, the value of their claim.'23 Conversely, all pre-
petition unsecured creditors generally recover only a share of the
bankruptcy estate proportionate to their claim against the debtor
from the remaining equity in the estate on a pro rata basis after
secured and priority creditors have been paid their due.' As a
result of this hierarchy, unsecured creditors commonly do not
recover the full amount of their claim, if any at all.
The Bankruptcy Code provides that certain unsecured
creditors receive priority in the distribution hierarchy of an estate's
assets.' Priority claimants are entitled distributions from
unencumbered property in the order delineated by section 507 of
the Bankruptcy Code'26 before general unsecured creditors receive
any distribution from the estate. Highest priority is given to
administrative expense claimants,"' which are defined as creditors
that provide "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate."'28 The existing body of case law on the area indicates
that to be classified as an administrative expense, a creditor's claim
must either have assisted in the administration of the estate's daily
operations, or helped preserve or increase the value of the estate.'29
Evaluating where an environmental claim fits within the
distribution regime of a bankruptcy estate is an arduous task. To
begin with, the federal government may have the rights of a
secured creditor pursuant to CERCLA section 107(1), which
permits the EPA to assert a lien against any property in violation
of the statute to the extent of response costs incurred in connection
123. Id.
124. See id. §§ 507, 726, 1122-1123.
125. Id. §§ 507,726.
126. Id. § 507.
127. Id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(l)-(2), 1123 (a)(1), 1129(a)(9)(A).
12& Id. § 503(b)(1)(A).
129. See id. § 503(b); see also Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968); In re
Amarex, 853 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod., 831 F.2d
118 (6th Cir. 1987); Am. A. & B. Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280
F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1960); In re Valley Concrete Corp., 118 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D.
R.I. 1990). For a list of cases applying the administrative expense doctrine to
bankruptcy cases involving environmental claims, see infra note 138.
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with the clean up of the contaminated property.'3 ° The lien enables
the government to recover payment to the extent of the property's
value. Although this lien grants the EPA a right to recover priority
payment in regard to the value of the property, the lien is junior to
preexisting liens and mortgages on the property, as well as to the
rights of a purchaser who buys the property before the government
perfects the CERCLA lien."' Additionally, if it perfects the lien,
the federal government has the rights of a secured creditor to the
extent of the contaminated property's value.' If the clean up
response costs were to exceed the worth of the property, the excess
expenses would be treated as an ordinary unsecured claim.'33 Some
states go farther and have enacted legislation in which violations of
its local environmental laws evince a superlien on the debtor's
property, which trumps existing secured creditors.'
Other environmental infractions involving property belonging
to a bankruptcy estate, whether being asserted by a governmental
or private entity, would seemingly have unsecured claim status;
however, governmental administrative agencies may seek to raise
its claims to an administrative expense priority and thereby receive
payment prior to other unsecured creditors. There are two
possible scenarios for conferring administrative expense priority on
environmental claims. The first, and easier of the two, involves
environmental claims arising after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. In these cases, where for instance hazardous substances
are released onto property of the estate subsequent to the petition,
courts have ruled that the response costs expended by the
government to clean up the property may satisfy the criterion for
an administrative expense."' Thus, to be an administrative expense
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1994).
131. See id. § 9607(1)(3).
132- See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 100.
133. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 507.
134. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 100-01.
135. See infra note 138. The seminal decision relied upon in this area is
Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968), in which the Supreme Court
held that administrative expenses or 'actual and necessary costs' should include
costs ordinarily incident to operation of a business, and not be limited to costs
without which rehabilitation would be impossible." Id. at 483.
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priority, creditors need not expend funds that actually increase the
value of the estate, but merely assist the estate in its daily
operation, such as by paying its expenses that qualify as "actual
and necessary costs. '  The general obligation imposed by the
Bankruptcy Code upon both a trustee and debtor-in-possession to
abide by the law in administering the estate'37 would seemingly
constitute the repayment of response costs for cleaning up
contaminated property that arose from a violation of
environmental laws as incident to the operation of an asset
illegally. Consequently, although the debtor might not have
preferred to expend its resources on the clean up, the legal
requirement to do so has led courts to decide that the resulting
governmental claim should be granted administrative expense
status.3 '
Strongly implicated in the discussion of conferring
administrative expense priority upon environmental claims are the
various interpretive stances taken to the Midlantic decision's
exception to a trustee's right to abandon environmentally
contaminated property. Noting the interconnection between the
two, one commentator states that "[c]ourts recognize that the real
issue in abandonment is not disposing of the property but
determining who is liable for environmental clean up."'39
Depending upon whether a court adopts a narrow or broad
interpretive stance alters whether a claim is deemed to have
administrative expense status. Permitting a trustee to abandon
property absent the immediate existence of an extreme danger
essentially has the effect of placing the burden and clean up costs
on the government. Property abandoned under section 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code reverts back to a lien holder or into the debtor's
possession retroactively to the time of the petition,' ° with the
136. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
138. See, e.g., Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P.
Mining Co.), 963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992); United States Dep't of Interior v.
Elliot, 761 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th
Cir. 1988).
139. Parker, supra note 24, at 258.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c).
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government thus left to shoulder the expense for the clean up.
Adopting a broad approach to the Midlantic decision has the
opposite result. Many courts have embraced the latter route and
prohibit a trustee from abandoning environmentally liable
property in virtually all circumstances and have given the
government's environmental claim administrative expense priority
against the assets of the bankruptcy estate over other unsecured
creditors.' The rationale is that if use or possession of an estate
asset contravenes environmental laws, as is posited by the
Midlantic court, then the priorities of the Bankruptcy Code
become subservient to environmental laws.' 2 As a consequence of
this approach, if a trustee is prohibited from abandoning
environmentally contaminated property, the cost of the
government's resulting claim would invariably be an "actual and
necessary"' 3 administrative expense, since the estate can neither be
maintained nor possessed without complying with environmental
laws.
The more difficult question involves the government's
contention to gain administrative expense status for pre-petition
environmental claims. Unlike postpetition environmental
infractions, pre-petition claims lack the qualification to be deemed
ordinarily incident to operation'" of the estate by the mere fact that
they preceded the existence of the bankruptcy estate. The
argument asserted by the government, however, is that the cleanup
of prepetition releases should be treated as administrative
141. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
142. See Parker, supra note 24, at 259-60 (discussing 'the "imminent and
identifiable harm" exception).
143. See Joseph P. Cistulli, Comment, Striking a Balance Between Competing
Policies: The Administrative Claim As an Alternative to Enforce State Clean-Up
Orders in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. RaV. 581,596 (1989).
144. See Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968) (stating that claims
arising from the operation of a business during an arrangement should take
priority over claims brought by "those for whose benefit the business is carried
on"); Cumerland Farms, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 116 F.3d 16, 20 (1st
Cir. 1997) (explaining that priority is given to administrative expenses that are
based on postpetition transactions and not prepetition transactions); 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(A) (providing for the payment of administrative expenses which
included the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate").
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expenses because the cleanup adds value to the property.'45 Courts
are split on whether this is a viable proposition.4 ' Courts that grant
administrative expense status to these claims rely on the section
959(b) requirement that a debtor in possession of property comply
with all valid state and federal laws, including environmental
laws. 47 However, other courts disagree on the basis that under
CERCLA there is no affirmative duty to cleanup past
contamination absent a judicial or administrative order."8 These
courts consider it extremely difficult to assert, therefore, that
repayments of prepetition response costs are "actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate' ' 49 that should be
granted administrative expense priority. Even if a prepetition
environmental violation is found to be an ordinary unsecured
claim, it may still gain administrative expense status.' This can
occur if the government, after the petition has been filed, imposes a
fine or penalty on the debtor for a prepetition violation.'
F. Application of the Section 362 Automatic Stay Provision to
Environmental Liabilities
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon the
commencement of a bankruptcy case, a debtor is entitled to an
145. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 103-04 and accompanying text
(stating the government's assertion that since cleanup enhances the value of the
property, the costs should receive administrative expense priority).
146. See id. (stating courts are divided on whether administrative status should
be granted to postpetition costs of cleaning up prepetition contamination).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2002) (stating that a debtor who possesses property
must comply with federal and state laws); see also Spracker & Barnette, supra
note 39, at 103 n.119 (listing courts that have adopted this approach).
148. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 103 n.123 (listing courts that
have rejected the section 959(b) argument).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2002) (describing "actual, necessary costs and
expenses" as administrative expenses).
150. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 104 and accompanying text
(stating that postpetition costs of cleaning up prepetition contamination does not
have administrative expense status).
151. Cf Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 104 and accompanying text.
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"automatic stay" from attempts by creditors to seize assets. "'
Violations of the stay are void or avoidable by the trustee even if
an offending party is unaware of the bankruptcy filing,'53 and
deliberate violations can result in sanctions against an offending
party."' The automatic stay has two central purposes: (1) to enable
the fair apportionment of the debtor's assets, and (2) to provide
the debtor with immediate respite from creditor pressure.'55
The automatic stay generally has been found inapplicable to a
debtor in violation of environmental legislation. 156 Subsequent to
the seminal decision in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of
Environmental Resources,157 courts routinely have concluded that
environmental claims filed by the EPA or other federal and state
governmental entities fall within the police or regulatory power
exception and are thus exempt from the automatic stay.'58 It
152. Specifically, section 362 imposes an automatic stay against:
(1) the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case... ;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2002).
153. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 32-33.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2002); see also FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 41-
42.
155. See FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 32.
156. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the automatic stay provision does not apply when a government
entity is suing to stop violations of environmental protection).
157. Id. (holding that the automatic stay provision was inapplicable to an
environmental claim).
158. Former subsection 362(b)(4) and subsection 362(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code mirrored sections 362(a)(1) and (2), respectively, and provided that when a
governmental unit is acting to enforce its police or regulatory power, the
automatic stay does not impede its ability to commence or continue a proceeding
in pursuit of that goal, or to determine the debtor's liability, fix costs, penalties,
or damages resulting from the environmental violation. In 1999, these two
subsections were consolidated into the new section 362(b)(4), which provides:
[U]nder paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit ... to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or
regulatory power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money
817
818 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
follows that governmental actions to enforce environmental laws
are permitted to continue regardless of a bankruptcy filing. The
one governmental action that is not subject to the pervasive "police
or regulatory power" exception is the enforcement or collection of
a "money judgment."'' 9  Thus, although the government is
permitted, even after a bankruptcy petition has been filed, to
establish damages, penalties, and costs related to an environmental
claim (as these actions are considered to be in pursuit of its police
or regulatory powers), the enforcement of money judgments
obtained in such proceedings is prohibited by the automatic stay.60
1. Equitable Stay
As an alternative means to pursue the benefits of a stay, given
that a governmental entity seeking to enforce environmental laws
will almost certainly not be curtailed in its endeavor through
standard bankruptcy remedies, a debtor may be able to petition the
judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2002). Courts and commentators agree that the amended
section does not alter the operation of the former two subsections, and the case
law continues to refer to the former statutory divisions. See In re Eagle Const.
Co., Inc., 283 B.R. 193, 198 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. 2002); see also NORTON
BANKRUPTCY RULES PAMPHLET 282 (2002).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (money judgments are not included under the
police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay).
160. See United States v. Nicolet, 857 F.2d 202, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that government suit under CERCLA for recovery of costs of cleanup work and
damages for past violations was properly allowed to proceed because the
automatic stay provision does not apply to injunctions, the enforcement of
injunctions, attempts to fix damages, or the "mere entry" of money judgments);
see also Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 865 (4th Cir.
2001) (stating that the section 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay provision
applies where the primary purpose of the law that the state is attempting to
enforce is to promote "public safety and welfare" or to "effectuate public policy,"
but not where the primary purpose is to protect the "government's pecuniary
interest in the debtor's property" or to "adjudicate private rights."). But see In re
Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
automatic stay should be imposed only where "the government action is pursued
solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the governmental unit").
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bankruptcy court for a discretionary stay. 6' Under section 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court may "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title. '16 2 This section is understood
to grant the bankruptcy court discretion to use its equity powers in
any manner it thinks appropriate."' It allows a court to enjoin
other judicial or administrative proceedings in order to facilitate
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code or other court orders."'
Included in the courts' discretionary powers is the ability to grant a
discretionary injunction.'65 However, the standard that a debtor
must satisfy before a court will issue a section 105 injunction is very
onerous, and even if the standard were met, a court may be
reluctant to exercise its equitable powers and grant an injunction
that supersedes or contradicts environmental policies and the
section 959(b) requirement that the debtor act in compliance with
the law. 66
III. HYPOTHETICAL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIM
Despite the incorporation of mechanisms into international
trade agreements to curb potential environmental abuse,'67
161. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 118 (describing how a debtor
can petition the court for a discretionary stay).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2002) (stating that no provision of the title prevents a
court form issuing any "order, process, or judgment" they deem necessary to
"prevent an abuse of process").
163. See Spracker & Barnette, supra note 39, at 118 (explaining that the court
has a full range of equity powers).
164. See id. (stating that a court can enjoin other proceedings in the interests
of protecting the assets of a bankruptcy estate).
165. See id. (stating that a court can issue any "order, process or judgment"
that it deems necessary).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2002) (stating that during bankruptcy proceedings the
management of property must in accordance with state law).
167. See, e.g., Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 11 (stating that one
of the objectives of the agreement is to "enhance compliance with, and
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations."). While numerous
environmental organizations support NAFTA, such as the National Wildlife
Federation, the World Wildlife Fund, the National Audubon Society, the
Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council,
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environmental provisions in trade treaties do not address the issues
that may arise if an international enterprise files for insolvency
relief but has multiple environmental claims being pursued against
it by member States. As a device for exploring the international
environmental/insolvency issue, this section will discuss the
hypothetical situation of a debtor corporation with assets in
countries that are party to the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").'68 To provide context to the hypothetical,
this section will begin with a discussion of the policies underlying
international insolvency regimes.
A. International Insolvenc.: An Overview
The need for bankruptcy laws is coeval with the existence of
business. "From the time that caveman Zog said to his friend Gub,
'I'm sorry, but I'm out of shells. May I pay you when I'm able?,'
there was a need for bankruptcy law."'69 By the same logic, the
current global stream of commerce necessitates a mechanism that
can resolve disputes arising when a debtor's inability to pay its
debts as they become due transcends national borders. However,
attempts to establish such a mechanism have been fraught with
difficulty.' In contrast to the ease with which domestic
Conservation International, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Nature Conservancy,
other environmental advocacy groups are opposed to its implementation. See
Stenzel, supra note 11, at 427. Opposed organizations include: Sierra Club,
Greenpeace, United States Public Interest Research Group, Citizens' Action,
Public Citizen, the Clean Water Fund, Earth Island Institute, and the Student
Environmental Action Coalition. Id.
168. See infra Part III.B. (providing a hypothetical involving parties to the
North American Free Trade Agreement).
169. FELSENFELD, supra note 2, at 1. "The power of establishing uniform laws
of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce and
will prevent so many frauds ... that the expediency of it seems not likely to be
drawn into question." THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
170. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 570 (1996) (asserting that "[t]here has been remarkably
little success in international conventions on the subject of bankruptcy, despite
great interest in the subject since the Nineteenth Century."); Harold S. Burman,
Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64
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bankruptcy laws can be implemented, numerous attempts over the
years to accomplish multilateral solutions for dealing with cross-
border insolvencies have been unsuccessful. 7' For the most part,
this result has occurred either because the scope of issues
addressed in treaties has been too narrow to cover all aspects of an
insolvency proceeding72 or because countries have been unwilling
to relinquish the amount of sovereignty necessary for equitable
distribution of a debtor's assets.'73 International agreements
dealing with insolvency issues date back as far as 1204' Early
treaties were primarily bilateral arrangements dealing with the
proper situs for a proceeding between member states."' With the
FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544 (1996) (discussing the failure to achieve
international insolvency reform); Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The
International Void in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307,
309 (1987) (stating that "few of the major trading countries have successfully
concluded a treaty with their trading partners.").
171. See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
221-22 (1999) (explaining how there have been few examples of international
regulations that have been successful in addressing international insolvency).
172. Bilateral agreements usually dealt with forum issues and provided no
guidance as far as choice of law questions. See id.; FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at
3-2 to 3-4, 3-14 (describing previous treaties that were limited in their scope).
173. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 3-8 (indicating sovereignty as the
primary cause for the failure of a United States/Canada treaty). The failure of a
treaty between Canada and the United States is especially surprising given the
social and economic ties between them. Nevertheless, despite the extensive bond
between the two countries, a mutually beneficial cross-border insolvency
agreement has yet to be achieved. See Perry, supra note 8, 485-88 (discussing the
difficulties in attaining a Canada/United States insolvency treaty). The troubles
in establishing cross-border insolvency agreements were anticipated early in
United States history and in response to a question posed by James Madison
concerning the possibility of a bankruptcy regime that would "recogniz[e] ... and
giv[e] effect to certain general and fixed principles, leaving the details.., to each
particular State," Henry Wheaton replied: "Such an international bankruptcy
code would doubtless be beneficial; but I should think that the difficulties in
establishing it by general consent would be found almost insuperable." Interview
by Jabez Henry with Henry Wheaton (1827), quoted in Cook, supra note 1, at 81.
174. See Cook, supra note 1, at 85 (referring to treaty between Verona and
Trent, which "provided for the transfer of a debtor's assets to the city conducting
the liquidation proceedings.").
175. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 3-2 to 3-4, 3-14 (discussing various
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advent of modern technology and the globalization of commerce,
the benefits of older agreements became limited and there was a
call for multilateral treaties. "6 However, although the creditor
protection and economic efficiency promised by international
insolvency treaties have long been considered beneficial, achieving
consensus and actually adopting treaties has proven difficult.'
Until recently, other than the Bustamante Treaty' and the Nordic
Treaty,'79 very few attempts succeeded.'8 ° Over the last decade,
however, emphasis has been placed upon trying to establish
multinational insolvency protocols, with the United Nations and
the European Union leading the way.''
1. Universality vs. Territoriality
A key component in understanding the considerations
underlying international insolvency in any one jurisdiction, and, in
bilateral insolvency treaties).
176. See FLETCHER, supra note 171, at 221-22 (describing how limitations of
bilateral agreements have led to a recognition of the need to develop multilateral
arrangements).
177. See Cook, supra note 1, at 82 (stating "most people think such
agreements are beneficial yet few think they are attainable.").
178. 86 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 246 (1929). The treaty was signed by the
representatives of thirty-two North, South and Central American States,
including the United States, and currently binds, in whole or in part, seventeen
countries. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 3-11 to 3-12.
179. Consolidated Treaty Series (1995 Supp.); General Secretariat,
Organization of American States, Inter-American Treaties and Conventions,
Treaty Series, No. 9, at A-31 (1993). The Nordic Convention has been in force
since 1933 between Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland. See
FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 3-1 to 3-14. It provides for extraterritoriality for in
bankruptcy cases and to a certain extent unifies the bankruptcy regimes of the
treaty members. See id.
180. See Cook, supra note 1, at 86-90, 95-96 (discussing the many failed
attempts to draft and implement cross-border treaties between the U.S. and
Canada and members of the European Union).
181. See UN Adoption of Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, supra note
5; EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 5; see also Perry, supra
note 173, at 478-86 (outlining some of the advances achieved by the European
Union through the International Bankruptcy Concordat).
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turn, the possibility of a country being a signatory to an
international insolvency treaty, is the dichotomy of universality and
territoriality.182
In its most extreme form, a territorial approach to insolvency
proceedings presumes that each country will seize the local assets
of a debtor for the sole benefit of local creditors without regard to
contemporaneous foreign proceedings involving that debtor.'83 If a
debtor were to have assets in more than one country, then an
insolvency proceeding in each country would be necessary." This
approach is known as the grab rule,'85 since the effects of a
bankruptcy proceeding are limited to the territory of the state in
which the proceeding was initiated, with local assets 'grabbed' for
the benefit of local creditors.' Leaving one writer to succinctly
state: "[t]he bankruptcy laws of the world ... were written as if the
drafting country were the only country in the world."'87
On the other extreme of the spectrum is a purely universalistic
approach, whereby all of a debtor's assets wherever they may be
located worldwide are administered in one central proceeding that
will be fully binding on other countries," Under a universal
philosophy, courts in affected countries will cooperate with the
182. See generally, Andre J. Berendes, The UNCITRAL Model Law On
Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 309, 313-14 (1998) (explaining that under the universality view "all the assets
are to be administered in one insolvency proceeding, wherever they are located"
and under the territoriality principle "effects of an insolvency proceeding do not
reach further than the sovereignty of the state where the insolvency proceeding is
opened.").
183. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 10-11 (stating that,
under the territoriality view, countries will not consider other proceedings that
may be taking place in other jurisdictions in their attempts to seize assets).
184. FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-25 (stating that the "territorial approach,
largely restricts the effects of law to the jurisdiction in which the law is
imposed.").
185. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 10 (describing the
association between territorialism and the "grab rule").
186. See Berendes, supra note 182, at 313 (explaining that under a territorial
approach, the effects on insolvency proceedings are limited to the state where it
is opened).
187. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-6.
188. See id. at 1-25 to 1-26; see also Berendes, supra note 182, at 313-14.
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main proceeding to help seize assets and otherwise assist the case.
189 Parenthetically, for a universal approach to have any effect,
both the country of lex concurcus (country where bankruptcy case
is opened) and countries where that same debtor has assets must
yield to the universality philosophy. "
It can be argued that applying the universality principle may
be more practical.191  Creditors wishing to recover their
indebtedness from a debtor holding assets located in numerous
countries would have to incur the cost of being involved in various
189. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 11-14. In addition to
the territoriality/universality dichotomy, there is another at times overlapping
dichotomy between an ancillary and parallel proceeding. The latter debate
addresses the divergent approaches taken when there is more than one
proceeding occurring simultaneously in different countries. The proceeding in
the debtor's home country will always be a full bankruptcy proceeding.
However, when a multinational corporation is a debtor in an
international insolvency proceeding, there will invariably be a need for
proceedings in the various countries in which it holds assets. The proceedings in
the non-home country can either be conducted as a parallel or ancillary
proceeding. Ancillary proceedings are those that are conducted with the view to
assist the main proceeding properly administer the case, but ultimately to allow
the main proceeding to adjudicate all of the debtor's assets worldwide. See ALI
Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 11-14. Other countries view their
proceedings as a parallel proceeding, or, in other words, as another main
proceeding. Id. A country's position in the parallel versus ancillary continuum
can be an indication of where they fit in the territoriality/universality dichotomy.
Id. Countries that utilize ancillary proceedings are said to be more universalistic
while parallel proceedings indicate more of a territorial approach. Id.
190. See ALl Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 14. A dispute may
arise if there is more than one proceeding ongoing simultaneously, as to which of
the two proceedings is considered the main proceeding. Under the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, the European Union Regulation and
the ALI Transnational Project, a main proceeding is determined by utilizing the
"center of the debtor's main interest" test. Id. So, for example, in the case of a
corporation in bankruptcy, the place of initial corporation is normally found to
be its center of main interest. Id.
191. See Berendes, supra note 182, at 314 (stating that when it is necessary to
file claims in more than one proceeding, large multinationals have an advantage
over small creditors, for whom it may be too complicated and costly to file a
claim abroad).
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proceedings around the word if a territorial approach were taken.'92
In addition, critics of the territorial philosophy have articulated
five major disadvantages associated with that approach.'9 3 Those
advocating for a territorial approach argue that following a
universalistic philosophy will unfairly result in foreign liquidators
assuming control over domestic assets and distributing them
internationally at the expense of local creditors."
Given the degree of sovereignty that must be relinquished to
comply with a universalistic approach and the impracticality of
adhering to a strict territorial position, it is not surprising that
domestic insolvency laws generally fall somewhere along the
continuum between the antithetical philosophies.'95 Although
192. See id.
193. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-27. The disadvantages are:
1. Reorganization is difficult or impossible because each jurisdiction is
looking for the maximum return to its own local creditors.
2. Even in a liquidation, assets may be sold at higher prices if they can be
packaged to maximize returns without regard to national boundaries.
3. Territorialism may lead to inequitable returns to different creditors since
different countries have different priority rules and, in addition, control over
different assets.
4. Shrewd debtors can move assets among countries in order to favor certain
creditors. Given the problems of creditors in entering other countries in order
to protect their positions and given also the flexibility offered by new electronic
communications, swift-moving debtors are difficult to control.
5. Foreign creditors often lose against domestic interests. This is due less to
the demands of any system than it is to the tardiness of notice given
internationally, and the difficulties in making one's presence known in foreign
courts.
Id.; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL. L. REv. 696, 706-08 (1999) (presenting five
advantages associated with the universalistic approach).
194. See Berendes, supra note 182, at 314 (discussing the negative
consequences of applying the universality principle without any restrictions).
195. Id. at 315. Berendes cites the Expert Committee's Report on Six
Categories of Domestic Insolvency Law completed at the Toronto Colloquium
for UNCITRAL and the International Association of Insolvency Practitioners,
which listed six categories of countries on the territoriality/universality
continuum:
(1) Countries with specific legislation for mandatory recognition of foreign
insolvency proceedings opened in certain specified countries;
(2) Countries with express legislation providing for selective recognition or a
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"modern academic and professional opinion has come down
overwhelmingly on the side of universalism,"'96 its impracticality
has led one leading scholar to state that universalism "is so far
from contemporary reality that it is not really part of the working
hypotheses of present scholars."'97  Thus, no country has yet to
adopt universalism in its pure form, nor are they likely to do so in
the future.'98 As an alternative, some have argued for a modified
universalism, which is somewhat analogous to the position
articulated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in section 304.'99 Under
this position, the country conducting the main proceeding attempts
to get its law to control the administration of the debtor's estate
and petitions foreign courts to assist in the proceeding when
necessary."° This approach is in accordance with the anti-
territorial philosophy, but at the same time is cognizant of
universalism's deficiencies. Essentially, "[m]odified universalism is
universalism tempered by what is practical at the current stage of
international legal development... ."'0 As a whole, current work
in the area of international insolvency agreements tend to
implement some form of the latter approach; they reject the
practice for discretionary recognition;
(3) Countries that feature a practice of discretionary recognition;
(4) Countries that are signatories to multilateral treaties dealing with access
and recognition;
(5) Countries with legislation based on the principle of strict territoriality but
with differing practice;
(6) Countries that are wholly territorial.
Id. The colloquium participants also stated that countries in category one were in
a good position while those in category six were not. Id.
196. ALl Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 11.
197. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27, 45
n.4 (1998) (discussing the two traditional views scholars have identified
concerning the administration of a multinational insolvency).
198. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 11.
199. LoPucki, supra note 193, at 725 (citing Jay Lawrence Westbrook's
characterization of the United States bankruptcy system); ALI Cooperative
Agreement, supra note 5, at 11; see also FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-38 to 1-
44; Cook, supra note 1, at 15-17 (discussing the United States presumption
against full universality).
200. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-33 to 1-34.
201. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 11.
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protectionist notion underlying territoriality, yet realistically hold
back from attempting to gain full universality by working to reach
agreement on choice of law and forum issues."
B. Hypothetical
For purposes of clarity, the duration of this Note focuses on a
hypothetical situation, which although it has yet to be adjudicated
in practice, will inevitably ensue with the increase of trade
worldwide, particularly in North America.
Assume a debtor in a United States liquidation case. The
debtor is an American company named EGN Inc. headquartered
in Seattle, Washington with operations in Toronto, Ontario and
Minneapolis, Minnesota. It owes the equivalent of U.S. $3,000,000
to secured and unsecured U.S. creditors. In addition to the above
claims, the debtor is being petitioned by both the United States
and Canadian governments for the repayment of response costs
incurred as a result of a clean up precipitated by violation of each
country's respective environmental legislation. Each
environmental claim is for the sum of U.S.$2,000,000. The debtor's
assets are U.S.$7,000,000 in United States holdings with an
additional U.S.$500,000 of Canadian owned property. 3
202. See id.; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J.
456 (1991) (arguing for the acceptance of some, but not all, characteristics of
universalist reform); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell
Communications, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2531, 2538 (1996) (discussing
transnational insolvency problems which arose in Maxwell Communication Corp.
(In re Maxwell Communications Corp.), 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Tobler, supra note 3, at 390-95 (advocating
the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law as the foundation for a universality-
based legal regime).
203. Although Mexico is a member of NAFTA, it is not included in this
hypothetical because it traditionally has been indifferent in enforcing its
environmental laws. Thus, Mexican law on the insolvency/environmental
interchange is negligible, and it would be highly unlikely for the Mexican
government to petition a United States Bankruptcy Court to recoup an
environmental indebtedness. See, e.g., Joseph E. Sinnott, The Classic
Civil/Common Law Dichotomy and its Effects on the Functional Equivalence of
827
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IV. UNCITRAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY2'
A. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Insolvency
In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly established the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.20 5
UNCITRAL was established in response to the growing incidence
of international trade as a means to help alleviate obstacles that
necessarily result from transnational business, and in particular, to
address the divergent stances taken by various member countries
to deal with such matters.2' To accomplish its goal, UNCITRAL
has set out on a mission "to further the progressive harmonization
and unification of the law of international trade. ' ,201 UNCITRAL is
unique from other United Nations activities; as opposed to the
U.N.'s general public law agenda, UNCITRAL seeks to promote
private law and commercial trade issues.2°8 The UNCITRAL
Commission is composed of 36 member states,m but non-member
the Contemporary Environmental Law Enforcement Mechanisms of the United
States and Mexico, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y. 273, 273-74 n.4. It is possible that
with the burgeoning of trade between the NAFTA States and the inevitably
resulting insolvencies, that transnational bankruptcy cases can be used as a
medium to advance further environmental protection in Mexico.
204. Although 11 U.S.C. section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is
currently in force in regard to the U.S. position in multinational insolvency cases,
there is a bill pending in the United States Congress to implement the Model
Law as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001,
S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001). Consequently, this paper
will consider the treatment of Canadian environmental claims pursuant to the
Model Law as opposed to analyzing it under section 304 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.
205. United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2003).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-20, 5-21.
209. As of June 1, 1998, the members of UNCITRAL, and the years when
their memberships expire, were: Algeria (2001); Argentina (2004-alternating
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states as well as interested international organizations are invited
to attend sessions or working groups as observers. 0
On UNCITRAL's 2 5 h anniversary, a Congress was held under
the theme "Uniform Commercial Law in the 21" Century."21 ' At
this gathering several participants suggested that, in light of the
insurgence of international enterprises and the resulting increase in
insolvencies and the apparent deficiency of any legal framework to
properly handle the failure of multinational corporations, it would
be appropriate for UNCITRAL to examine the disharmony of
international insolvencies and consider possible solutions. Soon
thereafter a colloquium was held, wherein it was decided that
although UNCITRAL could draft a unified set of insolvency laws,
it would at that time be premature to do so. 213 Given that advanced
commercial States probably would be unwilling to modify their
bankruptcy codes, as well as the difficulties that would arise from
trying to unify the divergent legal philosophies of UNCITRAL
constituents, it was determined that attempting to draft one
annually with Uruguay, starting in 1998); Australia (2001); Austria (2004);
Botswana (2001); Brazil (2001); Bulgaria (2001); Burkina Faso (2004); Cameroon
(2001); China (2001); Colombia (2004); Egypt (2001); Fiji (2004); Finland (2001);
France (2001); Germany (2001); Honduras (2004); Hungary (2004); India (2004);
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (2004); Italy (2004); Japan (2001); Kenya (2004);
Lithuania (2004); Mexico (2001); Nigeria (2001); Paraguay (2004); Romania
(2004); Russian Federation (2001); Singapore (2001); Spain (2004); Sudan (2004);
Thailand (2004); Uganda (2004); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (2001); United States of America (2004); and Uruguay (2004-
alternating annually with Argentina, starting in 1999). See United Nations
General Assembly, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited Apr. 20,2003).
210. Id.
211. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
the Work of Its Thirtieth Session, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/52/158 (1998) [hereinafter Model Law].
212 See United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2003); see also FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-21.
213. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, 5-22 to 5-23; see also Tobler, supra note 3,
at 405-06 (discussing the creation of the UNCITRAL Working Group on
Insolvency Law and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency).
214. The United Nations consists of countries under both the civil and
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cohesive bankruptcy regime would result in the entire process
being a futile effort.215
Consequently, it was decided a modest undertaking was in
order, and UNCITRAL limited the scope of its project to the
procedural aspects of an insolvency case rather than proposing
uniform substantive bankruptcy laws."6 UNCITRAL focused its
initial work on securing court access to foreign insolvency
administrators, facilitating judicial cooperation between concurrent
proceedings, and gaining recognition of foreign proceedings."7 In
1995, an intergovernmental working group consisting of more than
30 member countries was appointed by UNCITRAL.2 8 The
Commission proposed a final draft of the Model Law and it was
later adopted by the United Nations in May 1997.9
The Model Law is a recommendation that supplies a proposed
legislative language to countries looking to promote a more
universal insolvency regime. It is written as model legislation,
common law regimes.
215. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-22 to 5-23; Tobler, supra note 3, at
405-06.
216. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-22 to 5-23; Tobler, supra note 3, at
405-06. Incidentally, reading the language used in the Preamble to the Model
Law seemingly indicates an intention to implement more substantive provisions.
The Preamble states:
The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with
cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote the objectives of:
(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this
State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency;
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects
the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor;
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets; and
(e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby
protecting investment and preserving employment.
Model Law, supra note 211.
Nevertheless, the text of the Model Law only suggests procedural guidelines,
indicating that the Preamble is more aspirational in nature and an indication of
future work in the area.
217. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-23 to 5-28.
21A Id. at 5-28 to 5-29.
219. Id. at 5-29.
220. See Berendes, supra note 182, at 320 (discussing the content of the Model
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and, thus, a country can enact the Model Law as is, or it can add or
delete provisions prior to implementing the Model Law."' Similar
to the general principles articulated by the working group, the
Model Law is based on nine general principles.22  Since its
inception, the Model Law has been enacted to a significant extent
in the Mexican Bankruptcy Code amongst a very small group of
other non-NAFTA members, and is currently being deliberated
upon in the United States Congress.'
Law).
221. See id. (describing the character of the Model Law).
222. See id. at 321-23. The nine principles are:
(1) The court of an enacting State shall recognize only one foreign proceeding
as a foreign main proceeding.
(2) The recognition of a foreign proceeding should not restrict the right to
commence a local proceeding.
(3) A local proceeding shall prevail over the effects of a foreign proceeding
and over relief granted to a foreign representative, regardless of whether the
local proceeding was opened to prior or after the recognition of a foreign
proceeding.
(4) When there are two or more proceedings, there shall be cooperation and
coordination.
(5) A foreign proceeding shall be recognized as a foreign main proceeding if
the foreign proceeding is opened in the state where the debtor maintains the
center of his main interests. A foreign proceeding shall be recognized as a
foreign non-main proceeding if the foreign proceeding is opened in a State
where the debtor has an establishment.
(6) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding,
some types of relief will come into effect automatically. They will be in effect
until modified or terminated by the court. Upon recognition of a foreign
proceeding as a foreign main proceeding, the court may grant some other types
of relief, but they will not come into effect automatically. Upon recognition of a
foreign proceeding as a'foreign no-main proceeding, relief can only come into
effect if the court grants it.
(7) Coordination may include granting relief to the foreign representative. In
granting relief to foreign representative of a foreign non-main proceeding, the
court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets falling under the authority
of the foreign representative.
(8) Creditors shall be allowed to file claims in any proceeding. Payment to
creditors from multiple proceedings should be equalized.
(9) If there are surplus proceeds of a local non-main proceeding, they shall be
transferred to the main proceeding.
Id.
223. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Scene: The International Year in
Review, 2001 AM. BANKR. INST. J., LEXIS 231, at 1-3 (indicating that Mexico,
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B. Application of UNCITRAL to the Hypothetical Environmental
Claims
A stated goal of the Model Law "is to provide effective
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border
insolvency .... 22  While the scope of the Model Law is limited to
procedural protocols in transnational bankruptcy cases, some of its
procedural provisions affect substantive issues in a bankruptcy
case.' The hypothetical environmental claims represent this kind
of case. A multinational corporation is in violation of both United
States and Canadian environmental laws, and each government
petitions to recover its clean-up costs in a U.S. bankruptcy case.
The Canadian government, in so petitioning, is a "foreign creditor"
participating in an "insolvency proceeding" under U.S. law. 226 The
Model Law would therefore be applicable (to the extent enacted
by Congress).
A key advantage of the Model Law is "speed, speed, and more
speed."2 The Model Law is designed "[t]o avoid the dissipation of
assets that may result from time-consuming procedures or
considerations., 22  In petitioning a U.S. bankruptcy court, a
Canadian "foreign representative"" is entitled, thus, to apply
Japan and South Africa have enacted the Model Law in whole or in part); see
also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong.
(2001) (including the proposed Chapter 15 to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code which
proposes implementation of the Model Law).
224. Model Law, supra note 211.
225. See Guide to Enactment of the UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997)
(stating that "[t]he Model Law... does not attempt a substantive unification of
insolvency law," but rather "offers solutions that help in several modest but
significant ways."); see also Berendes, supra note 182, at 321 (stating that the
Model Law "has many substantive safeguards" and "provides for a system that
enables quick action," but that "[it] does not modify the existing material rules
concerning insolvency proceedings in the enacting State.").
226. See Model Law, supra note 211, art. 1, para. l(d) & art. 2(b).
227. Id.
228. Berendes, supra note 182, at 321.
229. Id.
230. Model Law, supra note 211, art. 2(d) (defining a "foreign representative"
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directly to the court rather than resort to diplomatic intermediaries
or get permission to have standing. 3' From this application, two
additional advantages accrue. First, upon the filing of an
application for recognition of a foreign proceeding, the bankruptcy
court may, at the Canadian representative's request, stay
executions against the debtor's assets, if in the court's estimation
"relief [were] urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or
the interests of the creditors. '' 2  Upon recognizing the foreign
proceeding, either as a main or non-main proceeding, the court
must then provide automatic relief or "grant any appropriate
relief," including "staying the commencement or continuation of
individual actions or proceedings against the debtor's assets, rights,
obligations or liabilities." 3  Second, at any time following the
application for recognition, the court may "entrust[] the
administration.., of all or part of the debtor's assets located in the
[United States] to the [Canadian] representative or another person
designated by the court, in order to protect and preserve the value
of assets that, by their nature or because of other circumstances,
are perishable, susceptible to devaluation or otherwise in
jeopardy."'
Because section 362(b)(5) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
prohibits a Unites States environmental agency from enforcing
money judgments, 5 securing the stay set forth in the Model Law
would be helpful in ensuring the Canadian government of being
as "a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in
a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or liquidation of the
debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding.").
231. Model Law, supra note 211, art. 9. "A foreign representative is entitled
to apply directly to a court in this State." Id. Article 11 provides that a foreign
representative may apply to commence a proceeding under the enacting State's
bankruptcy laws "if the conditions for commencing such a proceeding are
otherwise met." Id. art. 11. Article 12 provides that a foreign representative "is
entitled to participate" in a bankruptcy proceeding if the court has recognized a
foreign proceeding. Id. art. 12.
232 Model Law, supra note 211, art. 19, para. 1(a).
233. Compare id. art. 20, para. 1, with id. art. 21, para. 1.
234. Compare id. art. 19, para. 1(b), with id. art. 21, para. 2.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988); see also supra Part II.F. (discussing the
automatic stay's applicability to environmental claims in bankruptcies).
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part of the bankruptcy proceeding.
One provision of the Model Law that may bear directly on
environmental claims is Article 13. 236 Article 13 states, in brief,
three rules:
(1) In principle all [local and foreign] creditors have the same
rights and their claims have the same ranking [priority];
(2) As an exception to this principle, claims of foreign creditors
may be ranked as general nonpreference claims, but no lower;
and
(3) As an exception to the exception, the claim of a foreign
creditor may be ranked lower that a general nonpreference
claim if the creditor has a claim of the same nature as a claim of
a domestic creditor that is ranked lower than a general
nonpreference claim.
37
Although one commentator states that it is his hope
legislators will not adopt the exceptions delineated in Article 13
because of the potential impact on international commerce, 8
adoption of the first exception may result in disparate treatment of
a United States environmental claim vis-A-vis a similar Canadian
236. See Model Law, supra note 211, art. 13. Article 13 reads in full:
Subject to paragraph 2 of this article, foreign creditors have the same rights
regarding commencement of, and participation in, a proceeding under [identify
laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency] as creditors in this State.
Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the ranking of claims in a proceeding
under [identify laws of the enacting State relating to insolvency], except that the
claims of foreign creditors shall not be ranked lower than [identify the class of
general non-preference claims, while providing that a foreign claim is to be ranked
lower than the general non-preference if an equivalent local claim (e.g. claim for
penalty or deferred-payment claim) has a rank lower than the general non-
preference claims].
Id. (emphasis added).
237. Berendes, supra note 182, at 345 (discussing Article 13 of the Model
Law).
238. Id. (stating that "wide use of the exceptions to article 13 would hamper
international commerce" because only foreign creditors would be exposed to
losing their security interest).
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claim. Under this exception, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court could
grant the United States government's environmental claim priority
status, while treating the Canadian government's environmental
claim as that of a general unsecured creditor."
A more discernible distinction between the two governmental
claims should arise if the footnote to Article 13(2) were
implemented. In relevant part the footnote states:
The enacting state may wish to consider the following
alternative wording to replace paragraph 2 of Article 13(2):
Paragraph 1 of this article [seeking to equal creditors' rights and
claim ranking] does not affect the ranking of claims in a
proceeding... or the exclusion of foreign tax social security
claims from such a proceeding. 240
Prior to discussing the repercussions to the status of the
Canadian hypothetical environmental claim in a United States
bankruptcy case,' it would be beneficial to provide a brief
overview of the comity doctrine and its revenue rule exception.
1. Comity and the Revenue Rule Exception"2
The Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyo? 43 first enunciated the
modern view of comity requiring United States courts to enforce
foreign judgments. 244 The concept of comity has its roots in the
239. See supra Part II.E. (articulating that a United States environmental
claim may be granted administrative expense priority).
240. Model Law, supra note 211, at n.2.
241. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text (discussing that the
footnote to Article 13(2) is included in the current proposed legislation to reform
the Bankruptcy Code).
242. See Jeremy Smith, Note, Approaching Universality: The Role of Comity in
International Bankruptcy Proceedings Litigated in America, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J.
367 (1999) (comprehensively reviewing comity jurisprudence as it relates to
United States bankruptcy proceedings and 11 U.S.C. section 304 (1988) of the
Bankruptcy Code).
243. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
244. Id. at 159. The Court stated in dictum:
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theory of reciprocity, which asserts that U.S. courts are obligated to
hear a foreign claim only if a local claim "[could] be heard in the
foreign jurisdiction on the same terms should a bankruptcy arise
there." 5
[Comity] is not a rule of law, but one of practice convenience
and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and
accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an
imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons
protected by its own laws.246
In articulating a preference for universality, as well as respect
for foreign proceedings, Hilton and its progeny do, however,
delineate an important exception to the rule of comity. '7 If either
the judgment or "the cause of action on which the judgment was
based" is found "repugnant to the public policy of the United
States," comity should not be extended. 2  Courts following Hilton
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by
a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the
foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court. .. , the
judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the matter adjudged; and it should
be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless some
special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment ....
Id. The Court then held, in relation to the matter before it, that it "was not
require[d] to give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France"
because of "the want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect to be
given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries." Id. at 161.
245. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-60 to 1-61 (arguing that comity is a
distinct question of whether a U.S. court will give recognition to a foreign right,
but conceding that the two doctrines-comity and reciprocity-may be
inseparable).
246. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3rd Cir. 1971).
247. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 160 (stating that the judgment of a foreign court
may be impeached "by showing... that by the principles of international law,
and by the comity our own country, it should not be given full credit and
effect."); see also supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS].
2003] INT'L INSOLVENCY & ENVTL. OBLIGATIONS
have continued to use the public policy exception to deny
recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings,249 and courts
have articulated various opinions about the degree of
nonconformity with American mores necessary to disqualify a
foreign judgment." Overseas Inns, S.A. P.A. v. United States" is
the only known case in U.S. jurisprudence of a debtor seeking to
have a foreign bankruptcy ruling enforced in the United States. 2
The IRS, to whom Overseas, a Luxembourg corporation, owed
unpaid taxes, was treated as a general creditor in a Luxembourg
insolvency proceeding. 3 Overseas paid the IRS pursuant to the
Luxembourg plan, but the IRS later levied against payments owed
to Overseas by a U.S. corporation." Overseas then brought suit
contending that "the Luxembourg judgment was binding on the
IRS and that it had satisfied its obligation to the United States by
[making payment] in accordance with that judgment." 5  The
district court rejected Overseas' argument and held that the IRS
would not have received comparable treatment in similar
249. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937-44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "violation of public policy vitiating
comity" occurred when English court's ruling encroached upon U.S. district
court's rightful powers in adjudicating antitrust case).
250. See, e.g., Somportex, 453 F.2d at 443 (extending comity because
enforcement of English court's adjudication did not "[tend] clearly to injure the
public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the
administration of the law, or to undermine the sense of security for individual
rights.") (citation omitted); Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842-43 (2d Cir.
1986) (extending comity on the grounds that a German judgment was not
"repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just") (citation
omitted).-
251. Overseas Inns, S.A. P.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1990).
252. FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-84 (stating that "[w]e are aware of only
one case where a debtor who had been granted a bankruptcy decree... sought to
have that decree enforced in the United States...
253. Overseas, 911 F.2d at 1147.
254. Id. At the time of the Luxembourg decision, Overseas owed the IRS
$507.343.83 in taxes and $496,380.78 in interest. Id. Under the plan approved by
the Luxembourg court, Overseas paid the IRS a total of $179,135.76. Id. The IRS
then collected an additional $919,835.79 by levying payments owed to Overseas
by a U.S. corporation. Id. at 1147-48.
255. Overseas, 911 F.2d at 1148.
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proceedings in the United States.5 6 On appeal, the circuit court
held that comity should not be accorded the Luxembourg plan, on
the ground that the foreign court's ruling was against American
public policy "favor[ing] payment of lawfully owed federal income
taxes. , , 7
Application of the doctrine of comity to the hypothetical
environmental claims would seemingly allow for equal recognition
of the Canadian claims in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding. The
underlying objectives of Canadian environmental legislation are
consistent with American notions of morality, as indicated by the
close similarity of the two countries' environmental laws, "
However, the public policy exception has been interpreted to
extend beyond a mere determination of the prima facie morality of
a foreign law." The so-called revenue rule allows for the dismissal
of foreign State claims, based on the reasoning that courts of one
country do not enforce taxes, fines, penalties, or penal rules of
another country absent reciprocity.' 0 The rule that foreign
governmental interests should not be enforced was introduced into
American jurisprudence through Her Majesty the Queen ex rel.
British Columbia v. Gilbertson.261 In Gilbertson, the government of
the Canadian province of British Columbia filed suit in a federal
256. Id. at 1148-50 (affirming that the IRS would have received priority status
under U.S. bankruptcy law); see also supra notes 122-51 and accompanying text
(discussing the priority doctrine in the environmental context).
257. Overseas, 911 F.2d at 1149. The court explained that "[c]omity does not
reach so far as to allow one country to adversely affect another's tax revenues."
Id.
258. See Michael I. Jeffery, The Environmental Implications of NAFTA: A
Canadian Perspective, 26 URB. LAW. 31, 38, 41 (referring to the close similarity of
U.S. and Canadian environmental law and enforcement practice).
259. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
260. See RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 248, § 483.
"Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce
judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of
other States." Id. But see William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax
Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 265 (2000) (arguing for the overall revocation of the revenue rule).
261. Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d
1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
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district court in Oregon seeking to enforce a tax judgment against
residents of Oregon.262 On appeal, the circuit court declined to
enforce the claim on the ground that "recogniz[ing] the tax
judgment from a foreign nation... would have the effect of
furthering the governmental interests of a foreign country,
something which our courts customarily refuse to do." 263
Whether the Canadian environmental claim would be given
the same treatment in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding as the
262. Id. at 1161-63.
263. Id. at 1165; see also United States v. Harden, [1963] D.L.R. 366 (Supreme
Court of Canada, Affirming Court of Appeal for British Columbia); Alona E.
Evans, Judicial Decisions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 184, 190-91 (1980) (suggesting that,
under the theory of reciprocity, had British Columbia courts not previously
declined to enforce the tax judgment of a U.S. court, Gilbertson would have been
decided differently). See generally Kovatch, supra note 260, at 268-70. Kovatch
notes that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Gilbertson ruling based on the revenue
rule, which the court traced back to two eighteenth century English cases decided
by Lord Mansfield. See id. The first decision was Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1120 (1778), in which Mansfield stated, "[N]o country ever takes notice of
the revenue laws of another." Id. at 1121. The second decision was Planche v.
Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (1779), wherein Mansfield said again, "One nation
does not take notice of the revenue laws of another." Id. at 165. The Ninth
Circuit also relied on Learned Hand's opinion in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600,
604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., dissenting):
While the origin of the exception in the case of penal liabilities does not appear
in the books, a sound basis for it exists, in my judgment, which includes
liabilities for taxes as well. Even in the case of ordinary municipal liabilities, a
court will not recognize those arising in a foreign state, if they run counter to
the 'settled public policy' of its own. Thus a scrutiny of the liability is
necessarily always in reserve, and the possibility that it will be found not to
accord with the policy of the domestic state. This is not a troublesome or
delicate inquiry when the question arises between private persons, but it takes
on quite another face when it concerns the relations between the foreign state
and its own citizens or even those who may be temporarily within its borders.
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any
rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between
the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are
entrusted to other authorities. It may commit the domestic state to a position
which would seriously embarrass its neighbor.
Id. The Ninth Circuit cited, in addition, Justice White's dissenting opinion in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]o country has an obligation to further the governmental interests
of a foreign sovereign.").
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American environmental claim depends, thus, on which version of
article 13(2) the United States adopts, the first version that appears
in the text or the second version contained in a footnote.2 If the
United States adopts the exception articulated in the text of article
13(2), then the Canadian environmental claim might receive less
favorable treatment than a similar U.S. claim granted
administrative expense priority.265 However, under the present
proposed legislation to amend the Bankruptcy Code, the footnote
version stands to be instituted.2" Should this indeed come to pass,
Congress will have shown, with its articulation of the revenue rule,
a reluctance to require U.S. courts to recognize an environmental
claim made by a foreign government. Although the footnote itself
lists only tax and social security obligations as items to be excluded
from equal treatment, the revenue rule as it has been delineated
in the courts seemingly includes all foreign governmental
proprietary claims. 268 Further, the bill itself incorporates the
revenue rule exception.269 Thus, if the proposed legislation is
enacted, it should result in allowing an American court to exclude
the hypothetical Canadian environmental claim.
264. Model Law, supra note 211, art. 13(2).
265. See supra notes 122-51 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the
administrative expense provisions application in the environmental context).
266. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong.
(2001). The footnote is listed as section 1513(b) in the Congressional bill. See
Selinda A. Melnik, 2000-2001 Bankruptcy Legislation & Bankruptcy Rules, 819
PLIICoMM 9, 174-192 (2001) (providing the full text proposed amendments).
267. See Model Law, supra note 211, at footnote to Articlel3(2).
268. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
269. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong.
(2001). The revenue rule exception is stated in section 1513 (b)(2)(A). See
Melnik, supra note 266.
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V. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
PROJECT AND ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
A. American Law Institute Transnational Insolvency Project
With the passage of NAFTA and the expansion of free trade
between the agreement's signatories, a predictable increase in the
incidence of North American transnational insolvencies occurred."7
Cognizant of the complexities associated with trying to harmonize
or even coordinate a global international insolvency agreement,
the American Law Institute felt that the creation of NAFTA
"established a nearly ideal 'natural experiment' for discovering
regional solutions that might be adaptable elsewhere."'"
The marked contrasts that exist between the current
bankruptcy/insolvency regimes of Canada, Mexico and the United
States make it abundantly clear that absent some type of
cooperation between them reference to present applicable law
would not be able to satisfactorily resolve a cross-border
insolvency case. 2 Thus, in 1994, one year after the implementation
of NAFTA, the ALI launched the Transnational Insolvency
Project intended to "produce a framework for close cooperation,
and some integration, in the management of insolvencies having
effects in more than one of the NAFTA countries." 3 It was felt
270. FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 1-9.
271. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 1.
272. FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-17.
273. Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute
NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 7 (1997).
It should be noted, that the recognition of the need for uniformity or cooperation
of bankruptcy laws within North America existed even prior to NAFTA's
implementation. See Perry, supra note 8, at 470-73 (discussing various petitions
for a North American bankruptcy treaty). In the beginning of the twentieth
century, Justice Nesbitt wrote:
I think it is a very great pity that there should not be some legislation
immediately regulating many questions of international law.., between
Canada and the United States. The growing interchange of business, owing to
the geographical continuity, makes it very important that there should be well
defined rules applicable to both countries .... Take for instance, bankruptcy,
receivership and administrations.
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that to attain this result, the project would be most successful if it
focused on trying to achieve agreement between the three
countries on various legal issues, and establishing protocols for
international cooperation of proceedings short of actually
harmonizing the insolvency regimes of NAFTA members."' As
such, the ALI did not fully embrace an universalist approach, yet it
clearly rejected the notion of territoriality and the grab rule.275
The ALI insolvency project is unique in the sense that it is the
only ongoing attempt to resolve the difficulties in cross-border
insolvency cases in the North American region. Although it is a
non-governmental endeavor, the ALI hopes that since it is
comprised of distinguished experts in each country "[t]he paradigm
case of the project ... [addressing the] bankruptcy of a company
with headquarters in one of the NAFTA countries and with
suppliers, lenders, operations, assets, employees, and stockholders
in all three,""n6 will provide an effective resolution that can be
implemented by the NAFTA members. '
The ALI project is split into two phases.7  The first phase
requires each of the three NAFTA countries to summarize its
Justice Nesbitt, 1905 Universal Congress of Lawyers & Jurists 266, reprinted in
DALHUSIEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY D-18 (6
[su'th'] ed. 1986); see also Kurt H. Nadlemann, International Bankruptcy Law: Its
Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 324 (1944) (advocating for a
Canadian/American bankruptcy agreement). Furthermore, Canada and the
United States concluded a bankruptcy treaty in 1976, but it was never signed by
the parties and was not intended to be North American in scope. See United
States of America-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, Oct. 29, 1979, U.S.-Canada,
reprinted in DALHUSIEN supra note 273, at App. D.
274. Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 8; FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at
5-17.
275. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 31. General Principle I
provides that "Courts and administrators should cooperate in a transnational
bankruptcy proceeding with the goal of maximizing the value of the debtor's
worldwide assets and furthering the just administration of the proceeding." Id;
see also supra part IV.B.1. (discussing the universality/territoriality dichotomy).
276. Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 8.
277. Id. at 10-11.
278. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Transnational Insolvency Project of the
American Law Institute, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 99, 99-105 (2001) (detailing the ALl
project and its substantive provisions).
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domestic bankruptcy regime with particular focus on its procedures
in cross-border cases, so to engender a better understanding of its
laws in all of the projects participants. 279 Following that, Phase II
attempts to facilitate a system wherein creditors from all three
countries can cross-file claims against a common debtor.2" The
project also suggested a procedure to enable the implementation of
an automatic stay throughout North America upon the
commencement of a case anywhere in the continent, and establish
standing for insolvency trustees and administrators in foreign
courts."M As is evident from the above-mentioned goals, the ALI is
keenly aware of the limitations necessary to a successful project.
Consequently, the Project did not attempt to harmonize the
substantive bankruptcy laws of the countries, but merely to outline
means by which the three sovereigns can cooperate their insolvency
regimes in a multinational insolvency case without actually
merging them.282 Additionally, the difficulty in reaching consensus
between the countries in regard to choice of law and priority
questions, led the ALI to abandon resolution of these problems.'
It was believed that doing so would help avoid the possibility of
losing the project's pragmatic value and prolonging the amount of
time it would take to finish the joint effort. 2' The Project was also
limited to treating the insolvency of corporations and businesses
engaged in commercial operations, rather than the bankruptcy of
individuals, non-profit organizations, or financial institutions. 5
279. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 2. The three individual
statements are: Am. Law Inst., Transnational Insolvency Project: International
Statement of United States Bankruptcy Law (Tentative Draft, 1997) [hereinafter
ALI U.S. Statement]; ALI Canadian Statement, supra note 3; Am. Law Inst.,
Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of Mexican
Bankruptcy Law (Tentative Draft, 1998) [hereinafter ALI Mexican Statement].
280. Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 10.
281. Id.
282. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
283. Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 10 (stating that, at the outset of
the project, there was a goal to try and resolve choice of law issues).
284. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 24-29.
285. See Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 8 (discussing the purpose of
the limitation to corporations). The authors comment, that the ALI avoided
dealing with fundamental questions about personal exemptions, discharge,
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The content of Phase II is split into three parts: General
Principles, Procedural Principles, and Legislative
Recommendations. The General Principles are intended to outline
the "common values of the bankruptcy laws of the three countries
as applied to multinational cases." '286 It is also intended to provide
the policy bases for cooperation as a foundation for the Procedural
Principle section, which then suggests "practical approaches to
cooperation within the existing legal competence of the courts
without new legislation or treaties." '287 It represents the existing or
"best permitted practices ' 288 under the current individual
bankruptcy regimes of NAFTA members.89 Lastly, as opposed to
the Procedural Principles section, which lists proposals that can be
instituted under current law, the Legislative Recommendations are
more aspirational in nature."9  The latter section suggests
"[r]ecommendations for new legislation or international
agreements that will go beyond current law to permit a
substantially higher level of cooperation."29' The ALI notes that
many of the principles articulated in the projects first two sections
bear resemblance to the UNCITRAL Model Law's provisions, but
they are restated because the Model Law has yet to be adopted by
any of the NAFTA members at the time the project was being
domestic relations, and custody of children and rather focused on areas where
only commercial interests are at stake. Id. Additionally, it steered away from
discussing charitable institutions and highly regulated financial institutions for
purposes of efficiency. Id.
286. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
287. Id.
288. Specifically:
'Best permitted practice' is a phrase reflecting the fact that the field of cross-
border bankruptcy is just emerging in its modern form, so that existing and
practice in a given country in some respects may be underdeveloped, unclear,
or inconsistent. A Procedural Principle may be regarded in... [the project] as
applicable in a given country if it is permitted under existing law, even though
the current practice in that country may be underdeveloped, unclear, or
inconsistent as to the subject matter of the Principle.
Id. at 43.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 5.
291. Id. at 4.
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developed.2" However, it suggests that the Recommendations "go
considerably beyond the Model Law in recommending close and
nearly invariable cooperation among the NAFTA courts and
administrators in a variety of ways" '293 due to the proximity of their
economic and political relationships.9
B. Application of the ALl Transnational Project to the Suggested
Hypothetical
1. Stay/Moratorium
There are various provisions in the ALI Transnational
Insolvency Project that would particularly affect the administration
of a United States bankruptcy case in which the Canadian
government has filed to recover on an environmental claim.2" At
the outset of a case, all of the NAIFTA members provide for some
sort of stay or moratorium in both liquidation and reorganization
proceedings. 96 Although each of the country's stays have their own
exceptions,2 the project in Procedural Principle 4 suggests that in
the event of a single proceeding in one NAFTA country, the other
members should grant a stay preventing actions against the debtor
by its local creditor's and restrain the debtor from expending estate
29Z Id. at 29-30. Currently, Mexico has incorporated a significant portion of
the Model Law into its new Bankruptcy Code, and the United States Congress is
currently deliberating instituting the Model Law as Chapter 15 to its Bankruptcy
Code. See supra note 222 (discussing the nine principles behind the Model Law).
293. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 29.
294. Id.
295. There are various provisions in the project that have relevance to
environmental claims and the hypothetical suggested, but they will not be
discussed in this paper given that they are general cross border issues and are not
specific to environmental obligations. See, e.g., ALI Cooperative Agreement,
supra note 5, at 37; Id. at 87, 131 (suggesting that foreign creditors be given notice
of proceedings outside their country).
296. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 36 (General Principle III:
Moratorium).
297. See ALI U.S. Statement, supra note 279, at 23-25, 67-73; ALI Canadian
Statement, supra note 3, at 22-24, 51-53, 71-75, 110-113; ALI Mexican
Statement, supra note 279, at 50-54, 101-102.
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assets."' The so-called "recognition stay ' (stay in the country
where the proceeding is not occurring) should be invoked under
the recognizing country's bankruptcy law as opposed to applying
the law of stays proscribed by the foreign country where the single
main proceeding is pending." "It [thus] follows that... [the
recognition] stay will be subject to the same exceptions as under
local law and to the same possibilities of limitation or termination
as under local law."3 ' An example given to illustrate this idea is if
criminal proceedings were excepted from the stay under the
bankruptcy law in the State that recognizes the foreign proceeding,
the recognition stay would also not apply to criminal proceedings."'2
This may result in a stay being issued by the recognizing country
that is narrower or broader than the stay applied in the main
proceeding. 3
Despite the fact that the recognition stay suggested by
Principle 4 of the ALI project is recommended in a different
situation than the hypothetical, the logic underlying the Principle
makes it applicable to both. Principle 4 addresses the need to
institute stays when a proceeding is initiated in any NAFTA
country and consequently calls for a stay to be instituted in all
other member States in accordance with each country's domestic
law." Moreover, Recommendation 2 of the project advocates for a
continent-wide stay to be enacted immediately and automatically
upon the filing of a case in any one country.3 5 The rationale given
for allowing each country to apply its domestic stay, rather than
invoking the stay proscribed by the bankruptcy law where the main
proceeding is occurring, is premised on the notion that it would be
unfair to require the recognizing court to learn and apply the stays
298. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 56 (Procedural
Principle 4: Stay Upon Recognition).
299. Id. at 58.
300. See id.
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. Id. at 59.
304. Id. at 56-61.
305. Id. at 129 (Recommendation 2: Automatic Stay).
2003] INT'L INSOLVENCY & ENVTL. OBLIGATIONS 847
implemented in a foreign state.36 Arguably, it should follow that in
a scenario where a foreign creditor files a claim in the main
proceeding, the stay of the country where the single proceeding is
occurring should govern so as to not require the court of main
proceeding to learn and apply the law of stays of the creditor's
country of origin.
A difficulty arises, however, when dealing with a type of claim
that is excepted from the stay in the country of main proceeding.3 7
If, as in the suggested hypothetical the Canadian government is
filing an environmental claim, it is unclear if the exception to the
American automatic stay provision... (applicable to United States
environmental claims pursuant to the police power exception"M )
would also apply to foreign environmental claims. At first glance it
would seem that an analogy can be drawn from foreign secured
creditors who would be treated equal to a local secured creditor
pursuant to the stay provision articulated in Principle 4,"0 so too
should local and foreign environmental claims. However, the basis
for excepting United States environmental claims is the premise
that they are an exercise of the United States government's police
power,3" whereas Canadian environmental claims are not.
Therefore, Canadian environmental claims, although similar in
purpose to American environmental claims, lack the criterion of
being an exercise of police power to be excepted from the United
States automatic stay. The resulting distinction between American
306. Id. at 60.
307. See Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 18-19 (posing a similar
question about giving the same priority status to foreign tax claims).
308. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1988).
309. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of the 11 U.S.C. section 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay
when a governmental entity exercises its police power in the context of
environmental claims). It should be noted that the exception to the stay only
applies to commencing or continuing an action against the debtor to ascertain the
viability or amount of the claim; however, enforcement of money judgments are
prohibited under section 362(b)(5). Id.
310. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 59-58 n.82-83
(providing secured creditors as an example of a recognizing country
implementing domestic law moratoriums).
311. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
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and Canadian environmental claims as far as being subject to the
stay would seem fair considering that under Canadian law local
environmental claims are subject to the stay.312
2. Priorities
Notwithstanding the ALI's reluctance to address issues of
priority in cross-border insolvencies, it focused on three issues that
it felt would be helpful in administering transnational cases."' The
first Procedural Principle on the topic of priorities suggests limits.
According to this section: "A claim should never be given a
priority in an international distribution beyond what it would enjoy
in a strictly territorial system.""31 In other words, creditors in one
country can only recover on their claims to the extent of the
debtor's assets in their home country."5 Applying this Principle to
the hypothetical environmental claim, since the debtor only had
U.S.$500,000 in Canadian assets then even though the Canadian
government holds a "superlien" priority on the contaminated
property and any property contiguous thereto3.6 valued significantly
higher than U.S.$500,000, the Canadian government can only
collect a maximum of U.S.$500,000.3 7 The remaining balance of
the claim will be treated as an ordinary unsecured claim in a
United States bankruptcy case.3 8
At the outset of the ALI project there was hope of unifying
312. See Christopher W. Besant & Patrick Shea, Environmental
Responsibilities in the Insolvency Context: The Canadian Position,
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 29, 62-64 (John Barrett
ed. 1998).
313. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 116.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 117.
316. See Besant & Shea, supra note 312, at 71 (stating that "[u]nder [section
14.061 subsection (7), [of the Canadian BIA] such claims are given a special
charge ranking ahead of all charges on the contaminated property and any
property contiguous thereto and that is related to the activity causing the damage.
Thus, in respect of contaminated property and related adjoining land, the
remediation costs come ahead of all other claims .... ") (emphasis in original).
317. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 117.
318. Id.
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priorities among the three NAFTA countries;319 however, this was
left for a later date in fear that efforts to achieve this goal could
threaten the overall project." One of the larger concerns in
aligning priority legislation among the parties was reaching a
consensus on the preference that would be afforded foreign
governmental claims. 2' Given that countries generally do not
recognize and enforce the propriety interests of foreign
governments, reaching an agreement that would entitle foreign
governmental claims priority at the expense of local creditors was
extremely difficult.22  Nevertheless, the Legislative
Recommendations were an ideal place to articulate the ALI's
desire to reach uniformity of priority claims. As a result,
Recommendation 4 states: "Each country should adopt parallel
legislation granting national treatment with respect to priority
claims under their respective priority systems... ,323 Implementing
this Recommendation would require foreign and domestic claims,
that are otherwise equal, to be given equal priority.2 The
Recommendation, though cognizant of the improbability of
reaching consensus regarding priority of foreign governmental
claims in cross-border cases under the current state of the law, does
declare an exception to its overall call for cross-border priorities.325
After suggesting that like claims of foreign and local creditors be
treated equally, it declares this be so "except that the treatment of
tax claims and other public-law claims should be the subject of an
international agreement."326 Pursuant to this Recommendation, a
319. Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 10, 15-19 (discussing the ALI's
goal of unifying priorities between the three NAFTA countries and the possible
difficulties that may arise in the process).
320. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
321. See Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 18-19.
322 See id.; see also ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 132-33.
323. ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 132.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 132-33.
326. Id. at 132 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 237-39 and
accompanying text for the reason articulated in providing an exception for tax
and public law claims. Additionally, it may be argued that the reason for the
differentiation of priority treatment between governmental and other like claims
is that in contrast to employee, secured creditor, or other claims which are
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Canadian environmental claim (which should qualify as a public-
law claim) would not be entitled to the same priority as a similar
environmental claim asserted by a U.S. environmental entity.327
3. Binding Effect of Plan
Pursuant to the ALI Project, the distribution of assets in a U.S.
bankruptcy case involving a Canadian environmental claim would
be binding against the Canadian government in Canadian courts.
Procedural Principle 26 articulates that when there is a main
proceeding in one NAFTA country with no parallel proceeding
pending elsewhere within North America, then the plan instituted
by the court of main proceeding should be binding as to the debtor
and any creditor that filed a claim, voted in the reorganization, and
accepted money or property under the plan. 2 If the Canadian
government meets all these criteria, then it would be bound to the
reorganization plan and could not petition the Canadian
bankruptcy court for a second attempt to recuperate its full claim.29
Another Procedural Principle articulates parameters to be met
that can be binding on all unsecured creditors provided that the
single main proceeding has jurisdiction over that creditor.33 °
However, this Principle would not apply to the Canadian
environmental claim because governmental claims "would not
essentially equivalent regardless of their country of origin, governmental claims
are inherently unique. Each country's claim incorporates specific attributes
associated with its economic and political ramifications.
327. See supra Part II.E (discussing environmental claims vis-A-vis
administrative expense priority); see also Part V.B.1.
328. See ALI Cooperative Agreement, supra note 5, at 121.
329. See id. at 121-23.
330. See id. at 123-24. Procedural Principle 7 states:
Where a Plan of Reorganization is adopted in a main proceeding in any
NAFTA country and there was no parallel proceeding within the NAFTA
region, that Plan should also be final and binding as to the claims against the
debtor of every unsecured creditor (a) who received adequate individual notice
of the case and (b) who would be considered within the jurisdiction of the
courts in ordinary commercial matters under the law of the country of the main
proceeding, with respect to the types of claims asserted by the creditor.
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ordinarily be subject to jurisdiction in another country. ''0 31
CONCLUSION
International insolvency law, as it is currently situated, can be
divided into three categories. The first of these groups comprises
procedural protocols to facilitate coordination of multiple
bankruptcy proceedings that are simultaneously occurring in
various States. Second, are traditional bankruptcy laws, such as the
priority afforded to creditor claims vis-A-vis one another and
preferential transfer doctrine. The intersection of non-bankruptcy
principles within an insolvency proceeding constitutes the third and
final group.
Until now, protocols intended to resolve the dilemmas arising
where a debtor has numerous creditors situated in multiple
countries have adopted the first approach.3" Suggestions towards
establishing procedural coordination in the administration of
bankruptcy cases was deemed prudent, given the youth of the
international insolvency movement and the resulting apprehension
that States would be unwilling to relinquish full control over debtor
assets.33 In doing so, both the UNCITRAL Model Law and the
ALI Transnational Project also indicate an intention to
progressively increase multinational coordination in insolvencies to
eventually include coordination in the substantive aspects of
bankruptcies.
Upon further inspection, despite the fact that there is
intimation of future work to address conventional bankruptcy
issues in the multinational context, there is no discussion of an
effort to alleviate the problems that arise when non-bankruptcy
issues overlap into an insolvency proceeding. Environmental, tax,
and employee benefit claims are but a few examples of the possible
issues that can be encountered in cross-border proceedings as they
are in domestic cases. For instance, the implementation of
331. Id. at 127-28.
332. See supra Parts IV.A, V.A.
333. See FELSENFELD, supra note 3, at 5-17, 5-22 to 5-23; see also Tobler, supra
note 3, at 405-06; Westbrook & Ziegel, supra note 273, at 8.
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environmental legislation with its emphasis on imposing strict
liability has caused chaos when confronted with a debtor seeking to
shun environmental obligations through utilizing bankruptcy
remedies.334  This issue is only compounded when the
environmental claim is being pursued by a State foreign to a
bankruptcy proceeding.
Domestic insolvency regimes have attained compromises when
the conflicting policies of bankruptcy and other legislation
collide.33 In the United States this was primarily accomplished
through the judiciary, while in Canada by means of an amendment
process.336 Regardless, in advocating for coordinating cross-border
insolvencies, it would only seem prudent that the more common
non-bankruptcy claims be addressed in a fashion similar to other
established substantive bankruptcy areas. The difficulties that may
be encountered in reaching agreement on such provisions are
necessary, for inevitably non-bankruptcy issues will be stumbling
blocks necessary to be overcome to fully administer a cross-border
insolvency.
334. See supra Part II.
335. See supra Part II.
336. Hill, supra note 31, at 245-49 (comparing the development of
environmental jurisprudence within the insolvency context in the United States
and Canada).
